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3How (Not) to Take ‘Secularity’  
Beyond the Modern West
Reflections from Islamic Sociology
1 Introduction: ‘Secularity,’ Sociology, and Normativity
The scientist’s personal characteristics (personality structure and values) 
and scientific priorities (such as the standard work methods or questions 
considered urgent in his era), and likewise factors external to the scientist 
himself or the field (political, economic, and social circumstances), sow the 
seeds leading to the growth or rejection of an original idea that on (rare) 
occasions manages to transcend the hypothetical and provide a practical 
answer to a problem. In fact, theories are actually proven or refuted by these 
internal and external factors, and not on account of the success or failure 
of a laboratory experiment or the wording of a formula and an equation.1
The concept is not merely a sign for, but also a factor in, political or social 
groupings.2
Debates about the usability of the concept of ‘secularity’ in academic 
research are not merely theoretical. Standpoints are also politically in-
formed and arguments are sometimes emotionally charged. To some, 
merely using the term ‘secularity’ seems to inflict violence upon certain 
objects of research or even upon themselves. Others object to apply-
ing the concept beyond a particular arrangement of secularity, lest that 
defense-worthy arrangement be undermined. Taking a step back, however, 
the actual hermeneutical problem and historical question still seems rather 
clearly to be this: is it possible to uncouple the link between secularism 
as a political regime and secularity as an analytical concept with broader 
historical purchase?
1 Miri Shefer-Mossensohn, Science among the Ottomans: The Cultural Creation & Ex-
change of Knowledge (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2015), 4.
2 Reinhart Koselleck, Futures Past. On the Semantics of Historical Time, transl. and introd. 
Keith Tribe (New York: Columbia University Press), 156.
4The research program of Multiple Secularities3 hinges on this being 
possible indeed. Well in view of arguments for the inapplicability of ‘secu- 
larity’ beyond the modern West, Monika Wohlrab-Sahr and Marian 
Burchardt, the sociological architects of the theoretical program of Multiple 
Secularities, “pursue a strictly analytical understanding of secularity,”4 
which they aim to categorically separate from the political concept of 
‘secularism’. The analytical category of ‘secularity’ is meant to make sense 
of “distinctions and differentiations” between religion and the secular, also 
for contexts in which both spheres were not yet identified as such.5 High-
lighting religious-secular distinctions – that is: secularity – before ‘secular-
ity’ is not least meant to counter claims that before the impact of Western 
secularism, non-Westerners lived in an undifferentiated wholesomeness.6
If claims to wholesomeness form the fiercest frontline of the program 
of Multiple Secularities to apply ‘secularity’ as an analytical concept beyond 
the modern West, a second line of criticism objects to the pluralization of 
‘secularity,’ since this would open the door to historical and cultural rela-
tivism.7 Schematically, one may characterize claims to wholesomeness as 
“post-colonial” or even “anti-modernist,” and the argument for the singu-
larity of ‘secularity’ as “modernist,” whereas the program of Multiple Secu- 
larities in its very name and concerning some premises is drawing on 
the concept of “multiple modernities.” Post-colonial critics of ‘secularity’ 
often fall short of offering a viable constructive alternative, due to some 
3 The paradigm of Multiple Secularities was first presented in: Monika Wohlrab-Sahr and 
Marian Burchardt, “Multiple Secularities. Towards a Cultural Sociology of Secular Mo-
dernities,” Comparative Sociology 11 (2012). The project program was formulated by its 
directors in: Christoph Kleine and Monika Wohlrab-Sahr, “Research Programme of the 
HCAS ‘Multiple Secularities – Beyond the West, Beyond Modernities’,” Working Paper Se-
ries of the HCAS “Multiple Secularities – Beyond the West, Beyond Modernities” 1 (Leipzig 
University, 2016). While the main premises and arguments have remained consistent 
throughout, this is an evolving debate and I shall in the following refer to the latest pro-
grammatic article on Multiple Secularities: Monika Wohlrab-Sahr and Marian Burchardt, 
“Revisiting the Secular: Multiple Secularities and Pathways to Modernity,” Working Pa-
per Series of the HCAS “Multiple Secularities - Beyond the West, Beyond Modernities” 2 
(Leipzig University, 2017).
4 Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt, “Revisiting the Secular,” 6.
5 Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt, 12.
6 Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt, 10.
7 This line of criticism is represented by: Aziz Al-Azmeh, “Vindicating Post-modern 
Obscurantism,” Working Paper Series of the HCAS “Multiple Secularities – Beyond the 
West, Beyond Modernities” 15 (Leipzig University, forthcoming 2019).
5theoretical inconsistencies8 and their not addressing factual historical 
distinctions before modernity. The objection against the pluralization of 
‘secularity,’ in turn, is worth considering in view of the potential relativist 
effects of this wording. The program of Multiple Secularities could indeed 
equally be named Varieties of Secularity. After all, the basic intent and ap-
proach of Multiple Secularities is not to take one standard model of secu-
larity for granted, but rather to inquire into different varieties of secularity. 
In this scheme, then, Multiple Secularities appears as the sensitive, least 
normatively informed middle way between two -isms, which seem to sus-
tain each other: both identify ‘secularity’ too narrowly with the modern 
West, either as something to be retained (modernism) or to be rejected 
(anti-modernism).
In this paper, I argue that the basic approach of Multiple Secularities is 
indeed the commendable way forward, but could be refined and improved, 
also by learning from the valid points of its critical alternatives. Thus, this 
paper aspires to shed light on two basic questions, namely, how to take 
‘secularity’ beyond the modern West, and, as a logical prior, why take ‘secu- 
larity’ beyond the modern West in the first place?
This second, logically primary question concerns the normativity of 
Multiple Secularities itself. For, unlike the above positioning of a sensi-
tive middle-way may have suggested, it is hardly plausible to attribute a 
normative underpinning and political intention only to the other parties. 
Empirical usages of ‘secularity’ are always normative, as Wohlrab-Sahr 
and Burchardt rightly mention.9 Viewed from the outside, however, the 
protagonists of Multiple Secularities themselves also represent an empirical 
usage of ‘secularity,’ in addition to observing other actors’ usages via their 
analytical usage of ‘secularity.’ On what epistemic premises, then, does the 
program of Multiple Secularities rest? Which political context informs and 
allows it, also in view of the fact that the function of sociology tends to be 
bound to one national society? Asked simply: why would one want to take 
‘secularity’ beyond Leipzig University, beyond German society, beyond the 
modern West? Part of the answer seems to be the intent to affirm a secular 
understanding and arrangement of society at a (post-secular?)10 moment 
8 See: Hadi Enayat, Islam and Secularism in Post-Colonial Thought: A Cartography of Asa-
dian Genealogies (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).
9 Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt, “Revisiting the Secular,” 6.
10 For a critical assessment of the concept ‘post-secularism’ and its proponents, see: Aamir 
6when this arrangement has become questionable. This affirmation does 
not merely want to reproduce a particular secular(ist) understanding and 
arrangement, but, in our globally connected present and in face of increas-
ingly plural societies, wants to take other variations into account.
Under this basic intent, which I do share, two basic challenges present 
themselves regarding as to how to take ‘secularity’ beyond one’s own un-
derstanding: first, to avoid merely subsuming other understandings and 
arrangements under one’s own. Secondly, not to expand the concept of 
‘secularity’ beyond its recognizability. These challenges are partially in-
herent to any comparative enterprise, but become especially important 
in light of the political ramifications of ‘secularity’: those understandings 
and arrangements that are grasped with the concept of ‘secularity’ and are 
thus presented as variations of secularity are thereby also posited as ac-
ceptable versions or parts of secular society. Thus, the limits of expanding 
and applying the concept of ‘secularity’ have to be equally addressed as the 
potentials of doing so. Moreover, it is crucial to ensure that in this process 
of expanding ‘secularity,’ the relation to one’s own starting point is consis-
tently retained.
This starting point, it cannot be doubted, is informed by and even 
forms part of the hegemonic (self-)understanding of modernity. As part of 
the modern order, ‘secularity’ can never be a merely descriptive concept, 
but always contains a normative dimension, too. That dimension needs 
not always be explicit, and in non-politicized usages of the concept it will 
not be, but it can readily be explicated by problematizing the meanings 
and functions of that concept. In this regard and like other concepts of the 
modern order such as ‘religion’ and ‘society,’ ‘secularity’ – which itself rests 
on the aforementioned concepts – is a “thick concept.”11 This is certainly 
one reason why the intended usage of ‘secularity’ as a mere analytical 
R. Mufti, “Why I Am Not a Postsecularist,” boundary 2 40, no. 1 (2013). It is also worth 
recalling that Habermas, who coined the term ‘post-secular’ did not mean to indicate the 
end of secular societies but rather acknowledged, from his own non-religious perspec-
tive, the continuing existence of religious communities within a secular environment; 
see: Jürgen Habermas, Glauben und Wissen. Friedenspreis des Deutschen Buchhandels 
2001 (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 2001), 13.
11 Reinhard Schulze, Der Koran und die Genealogie des Islam (Basel: Schwabe, 2015), 
15. Schulze takes the notion of “thick concept” from Bernard Williams. A difference to 
Williams, not explicated by Schulze, is that Williams referred only to concepts whose evalu-
ative character was either inherently positive (e.g. bravery) or negative (e.g. murder), while 
concepts like ‘religion’ and ‘society’ can be imbued with either a positive or a negative sense.
7concept can readily be challenged. More importantly, configuring ‘secu-
larity’ as an analytical category does contain the risk of primarily confirm-
ing hegemonic modernity by subsuming under its order other kinds of 
distinctions. In turn, treating ‘secularity’ as a historical category primarily 
inquires into the formation of the modern distinction of secularity while 
asking for possible variations of secularity and for alternative distinc-
tions, not least with the purpose of establishing which aspects of modern 
(Western) secularity are particular and which are shared more widely. 
Ultimately, ‘secularity’ can indeed hardly be a mere analytical category, 
and hence is preferably treated as a historical category.
This suggestion does not fundamentally depart from the program 
of Multiple Secularities, but rather, I think, spells out the consequences of 
basic insights formulated in that very program and avoids some norma-
tive pitfalls, while retaining the importance and fruitfulness of analyzing 
different variations of secularity. Crucial are the following insights: ‘reli-
gion’ and ‘the secular,’ and concomitantly ‘secularity,’ were only identified 
as such at a given historical moment;12 secularity is a common condition 
and self-interpretation of modern and contemporary societies; the hege-
monic elaboration of secularity, which is associated with secularism as a 
political doctrine, is but one variety of secularity; other modern varieties 
of secularity were elaborated in engaging the hegemonic variety, conven-
tionally dubbed “Western”; also hegemonic secularity did not evolve in a 
self-contained West but was shaped in and by more plural encounters;13 
non-hegemonic elaborations of secularity are not only due to the impact 
of Western secularity, but draw on other resources and earlier distinctions 
and differentiations.
The question though is – and here I suggest modifying the approach 
of Multiple Secularities – which distinctions and differentiations one con-
siders as ‘secularity’. In other words, can and should we speak of secularity 
before or without ‘secularity’? This question implies that my focus in this 
paper will be on only one of the two lines of inquiry of Multiple Secularities, 
12 Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt, “Revisiting the Secular,” 12.
13 This crucial aspect has not been the focus of Multiple Secularities thus far, but is basically 
acknowledged in core contributions to the program, see: Christoph Kleine, “The Secular 
Ground Bass of Pre-modern Japan Reconsidered: Reconsidered. Reflections upon the 
Buddhist Trajectories towards Secularity,” Working Paper Series of the HCAS “Multiple 
Secularities – Beyond the West, Beyond Modernities” 5 (Leipzig University, 2018), 7n6; 
Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt, “Revisiting the Secular,” 27.
8namely on distinctions, rather than differentiations. To trace ‘secularity’ as 
a historical category of order rather than using it as an analytical one – and 
one inevitably has to decide for either one of these two lines of inquiry – in 
a sense turns a problem (the normativity of ‘secularity’ as a thick concept) 
into a topic, since it asks how different varieties of secularity evolved.
A critical appraisal of two other contributions to this Working Paper 
series might help to elucidate my own perspective. Since ‘religion’ and the 
‘secular’ are hardly universal categories expressing some anthropological 
given, there can be no question that ‘religion’ and the ‘secular’ were con-
structed at a contingent historical moment or moments to both interpret 
and order the world. In this regard, I share the arguments for a constructiv-
ist approach recently made by Markus Dreßler.14 Dreßler, however, largely 
limited his considerations to the modern context.15 In order to establish in 
which ways the construction of ‘religion’ and the ‘secular’ is particularly 
modern and in which ways it drew on and evolved out of earlier construc-
tions, one inevitably has to inquire into possible earlier constructions or 
alternatives to them. Christoph Kleine, in this same Working Paper series, 
has done so for the case of Japan.16 He argues that in pre-modern Japan, 
as early as the 8th century, a distinct category to be likened to ‘religion’ was 
established, concomitant with its counterpart of the ‘mundane’ or ‘secular.’ 
Kleine further argues that this “secular ground bass” of Japan facilitated 
the appropriation of Western secularity in modernity. While this is plausi-
ble indeed, it remains somewhat unclear how Japanese concepts likened to 
‘religion’ and ‘the secular’ – and clearly so from within the contemporary 
academy – intersected with modern Western concepts, and also what the 
main differences between these two are. Thus, both Dreßler’s and Kleine’s 
arguments are convincing in themselves, but might benefit from strength-
ening the links between their own understanding of ‘secularity,’ modern 
concepts of ‘secularity’ and pre-modern varieties or alternatives.
The question whether and to what extent ‘secularity’ as a historical 
concept can be traced beyond modernity, has to be posed as an open one. 
Hermeneutically, this is a genealogical enterprise, due to its starting-point 
14 Markus Dreßler, “Modes of Religionization: A Constructivist Approach to Secularity,” 
Working Paper Series of the HCAS “Multiple Secularities – Beyond the West, Beyond Mo-
dernities” 7 (Leipzig University, 2019).
15 Dreßler briefly mentions constructions of religion also before modernity (Dreßler, 6). I 
do find it difficult to reconcile this statement with his overall argument.
16 Kleine, “The Secular Ground Bass.”
9within contemporary, hegemonically shaped secularity. In order to bring 
in potential alternatives, a genealogical perspective on the makings of mod-
ern concepts ought however to be complemented with one of conceptual 
history, all the while ensuring the connection between historical concepts 
and modern secularity. Moreover, in order to not merely subsume earlier 
distinctions under ‘secularity,’ one needs a historical model depicting dis-
tinctions before secularity. Relating earlier distinctions to secularity in the 
absence of direct historical connections requires a tertium comparationis, 
which, it ought to be clear, cannot be ‘secularity’ itself. I will return to these 
suggestions on handling ‘secularity’ in the conclusion.
In order to illuminate the suggested perspective from a distance, the 
main part of this paper takes another step back and addresses the historicity 
and normativity not of secularity, but of hegemonic sociology and its poten-
tial alternatives. As with ‘secularity’ later, I will also discuss sociology and its 
alternatives with a focus on Islamic varieties. I consider this move illuminat-
ing due to, firstly, historical and theoretical connections between secularity 
and sociology and, secondly, fundamental analogies between ‘secularity’ and 
‘sociology’ as modern categories to be potentially expanded.
Firstly, sociology, in its hegemonic variety and also beyond, is itself 
inherently secular and, moreover, the very usage of ‘secularity’ as an ana- 
lytical concept is a sociological enterprise. As the institutionalized theo- 
retical analysis and interpretation of modern secular societies, sociology 
also elaborated the concept of secularity and thereby formulated conditions 
and criteria for being modern and secular. To explicitly interpret and order 
the social world via ‘secularity’ means to uphold a particular interpretation 
of the world that is neither objective, nor universal. As Wohlrab-Sahr and 
Burchardt rightly stress, ‘secularity’ is not an analytical category for all ac-
tors, not even those who are actually operating with distinctions identified 
as ‘secularity’ by sociologists.17 While the normative position of other actors 
not explicitly sharing in the paradigm of ‘secularity’ can be brought out from 
the analytical perspective of hegemonic sociology, the latter is not a purely 
academic, neutral perspective either. Rather, I suggest, the particular norma-
tivity of hegemonic sociology itself came to recede into the background with 
the discipline’s increasing professionalization and success.
17 Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt, “Revisiting the Secular,” 14.
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Secondly, while the paradigm of ‘secularity’ is of course also contested 
within sociology, my concern here is with the basic normativity of Euro-
centric sociology and its potential alternatives. In our global present, the 
aim ought to be a less-Eurocentric, more-inclusive sociology. Under this 
aim, the history of sociology and possible earlier sociologies are also to be 
reconsidered. Aiming for a more plural sociology, however, equally needs 
to reflect upon the limits to this endeavor, has to inquire into the particu-
larity of one’s own perspective and has to ask to what extent and on which 
level alternatives are actually possible and whether these alternatives can 
still meaningfully be called ‘sociology.’ I argue these hermeneutical chal-
lenges present themselves analogously in regard to ‘secularity’ and its po-
tential expansion.
I will flesh out the above aspects concerning sociology in sections 2 to 
4. Section 2 discusses post-colonial challenges to the alleged Eurocentrism 
of mainstream sociology and alternatives proposed from within the 
English academy. This discussion provides the background for engaging 
in propositions of an Islamic Sociology, formulated in Arabic, in section 3. 
After some information on the formation of sociology in the Arab world, 
I will use propositions of an Islamic Sociology to refer back to hegemonic 
sociology and to reflect upon the premises and criteria of sociology. Build-
ing on this, in section 4, I will then discuss the possibilities of including 
non-hegemonic Islamic sociologies in a common understanding of socio- 
logy, both concerning present propositions of Islamic Sociology, as well as 
the pre-modern sociological tradition highlighted by these propositions. 
Section 5 will then return to ‘secularity,’ hopefully illuminated by the re- 
lated discussions on ‘sociology’.
2 Towards a less-Eurocentric Sociology
2.1 Engaging the Problem of Eurocentrism
First voiced from the periphery, criticisms of sociology being Eurocentric 
or colonialist have by now entered the center of the discipline, especially 
in the English-speaking academy. In the Arab-Islamic world, the first ex-
plicit demands to “decolonize sociology” were put forward in the 1970s, 
already then in English and in reference to European post-colonial 
11
thought.18 Nevertheless, in 1997, Raewyn Connell still rightly positioned 
her experiment at making knowledge production in the social sciences 
more democratic globally at the margins of her discipline.19 Today, how- 
ever, sociologists show increasing awareness for the colonial heritage of 
their discipline and discuss its Eurocentric aspects more widely. This is 
exemplified by two collective volumes, one on Decolonizing European So-
ciology20 and one on Postcolonial Sociology.21 Moreover, while the aim to 
“decolonize sociology” often remains on a rather abstract level,22 it also 
produces more practical attempts, such as the social science program at the 
African Leadership University (ALU) inaugurated in Mauritius in 2015.23
Calls for decolonization have clearly both a theoretical and political di-
mension, questioning both the salience of hegemonic sociological theories 
and demanding greater diversity among sociologists. While these dimen-
sions are doubtlessly related, they should be distinguished as far as possi-
ble. Politically, who could object to the goal that peoples of all backgrounds 
and identities ought to be able to participate equally in sociology, as in 
the overall academy? One can also hardly deny that the question of who 
is included and excluded from the historical and theoretical canon of the 
discipline also depends on the diversity of sociologists themselves. This 
awareness, fought hard for by (previously) marginalized groups, is impor- 
tant in that it prompts to reflect upon the nexus of knowledge and power in 
one’s own discipline and upon one’s own positionality.
Things get out of hand, however, when the diversity of identities is 
transposed onto the  theoretical level. This becomes most manifest in a 
culturalist relativism that posits that people have not only different, but 
18 Abdelkader Zghal and Hachmi Karoui, “Decolonization and Social Science Research: 
The Case of Tunisia,” Middle East Studies Association Bulletin 7, no. 3 (1973); Tahar Ben 
Jelloun, “Decolonizing Sociology in the Maghreb: Usefulness and Risks of a Critical 
Function,” in Arab Society: Social Science Perspectives, ed. Saad Eddin Ibrahim and Nicho- 
las S. Hopkins (Cairo: American University of Cairo Press, 1977).
19 Raewyn Connell, Southern Theory: The Global Dynamics of Knowledge in Social Science 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007).
20 Encarnación Gutiérrez Rodríguez, Manuela Boatcă and Sérgio Costa, eds., Decolonizing 
European Sociology: Transdisciplinary Approaches (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010).
21 Julian Go, ed. Postcolonial Sociology (Bingley: Emerald, 2013).
22 For example: Gennaro Ascione, Science and the Decolonization of Social Theory: Unthink-
ing Modernity (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).
23 Jess Auerbach, “What a new university in Africa is doing to decolonise social sciences,” 
The Conversation, May 13, 2017, https://theconversation.com/what-a-new-universi-
ty-in-africa-is-doing-to-decolonise-social-sciences-77181.
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mutually incompatible views and identities. A focus on culture can also 
gloss over more significant differences shaping one’s position in the world, 
such as economic resources and social status. Most importantly, at a theo- 
retical level, diversity is hardly a value in itself. In other words, the salience 
and fruitfulness of a theory does not hinge on it being as diverse as pos-
sible, let alone on the diverse identities of sociologists following a theory. 
The charge of Eurocentrism also occasionally leaves unclear what Euro-
centrism consists of theoretically or methodologically.24 And at what point 
would the allegedly colonial or Eurocentric aspects of sociology be finally 
unthought or sufficiently diversified? Expanding and diversifying sociolo-
gy thus entails the risk of undermining the very basis on which sociology 
stands. In that sense, some postcolonial critics might unwillingly under-
mine the bases on which their own knowledge-production rests.
Theoretically, then, the aim in our global present – and Multiple 
Secularities shares this aim in regard to secularity – has to be to go beyond 
both the hegemonic universalism of sociology as well as particularisms in 
the name of diversity. Today, one can hardly disagree with the attempt of 
the Handbook of International Sociology “to move beyond the binaries of 
universalism versus relativism/particularism to posit a third position that 
suggests sociological traditions are both universal and diverse.”25
Among the concrete attempts to not only criticize Eurocentric socio- 
logy, but also to push for a constructive alternative, the work of Gurminder 
Bhambra stands out. In her book, Rethinking Modernity: Postcolonialism 
and the Sociological Imagination, published in 2007,26 Bhambra forcefully 
criticized the absence of non-Europeans from mainstream sociology, both 
concerning its historical self-understanding and its analytical frameworks. 
She ends that book with suggestions as to how to overcome these defects 
by working towards “connected histories;”27 suggestions that she then 
24 For critical remarks on this point, see: Gregor McLennan, “Eurocentrism, Sociology, 
Secularity,” in Decolonizing European Sociology: Transdisciplinary Approaches, ed. En-
carnación Gutiérrez Rodríguez, Manuela Boatcă, and Sérgio Costa (Farnham: Ashgate, 
2010), esp. 122–25.
25 Sujata Patel, “Introduction: Diversities of Sociological Traditions,” in The ISA Handbook 
of Diverse Sociological Traditions, ed. Sujata Patel (London: SAGE, 2010), 16.
26 Gurminder K. Bhambra, Rethinking Modernity: Postcolonialism and the Sociological 
Imagination (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
27 This paradigm is taken from Subrahmanyam. See first: Sanjay Subrahmanyam, “Con-
nected Histories: Notes towards a Reconfiguration of Early Modern Eurasia,” Modern 
Asian Studies 31, no. 3 (1997): 735–62.
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elaborated in her monograph on Connected Sociologies, published in 2014.28 
Bhambra’s aim of “connected sociologies” is meant to construct a more 
inclusive sociology by connecting, rather than simply adding different per-
spectives. This prospective aim has to go along with retrospectively inquiring 
into the power structures that have come to shape and still shape the canon 
of sociology. However, Bhambra argues, expanding that canon must not 
merely add new instances to what came to be established sociology, but must 
transform the understanding of sociology itself. Earlier attempts at diversi-
fication had failed to do so, she claims. A major target of hers is Eisenstadt’s 
theory of “multiple modernities”; and Bhambra is right in pointing out, as 
others had done before,29 that this theory remains Eurocentric in nature. 
After all, Eisenstadt conceived of modernity as only originating in Europe 
and then being multiplied through different appropriations. Bhambra also 
criticizes calls for “indigenous sociologies” as impasses, for they merely added 
to and confirmed hegemonic sociology.30 Here I would submit that indige-
nous sociologies have made a difference to the understanding of sociology, 
even though they did not change it fundamentally. Overall, while Bhambra 
forcefully and convincingly demands to reflect upon the nexus of power and 
knowledge in sociology, the question remains to what extent and from which 
position it is possible or even desirable to change sociology fundamentally.
On a more critical note, Bhambra does not complement her plea for 
expanding and diversifying sociology with criteria for the possibilities 
and limits of this operation. She might indeed be willing to take the risk 
of transforming sociology in a more open process, with the possible out-
come not being sociology anymore. Here, I would object that a sociological 
mode of viewing and interpreting the social world is worth maintaining. 
In general, and unlike some critics of modernity suggest, what also came 
about in a contingent, historical process – and from my secular perspec-
tive that includes every aspect of human thought and behavior – can be of 
value. The fact that sociology was established in a historically contingent 
28 Gurminder K. Bhambra, Connected Sociologies (London: Bloomsbury, 2014).
29 See, for example: Sujata Patel, “Are the Theories of Multiple Modernities Eurocentric? 
The Problem of Colonialism and Its Knowledge(s),” in Worlds of Difference, ed. Saïd Amir 
Arjomand and Elisa Reis (London: Sage, 2013).
30 Attempts at indigenous sociology had been criticized already at an early stage; see, for ex-
ample, Abdelkebir Khatibi, “Double Criticism: The Decolonization of Arab Sociology,” 
in Contemporary North Africa: Issues of Development and Integration, ed. Halim Barakat 
(Washington, DC: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, 1985).
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process, which inevitably included a power dimension, can thus not be in 
itself an argument against its premises and structure. It also means that 
the contours of sociology can and do change, but that core constituents of 
sociology, while historically made, cannot be simply unthought or undone. 
What is definitely ironic is the lack in Bhambra’s work – and tendentiously 
in post-colonial scholarship more widely – of engagement with contribu-
tions in languages other than English. After all, the importance of language 
and concepts in theoretically understanding and partially even construct-
ing the social world should be obvious. The following section will bring 
such non-English, in my case Arabic, contributions into the discussion in 
order to reflect upon and potentially expand the hegemonic understanding 
of sociology. The self-reflective starting point for this potential expansion 
lies within the secular, English-speaking academy, with its particular hege-
monic categories.
From this starting point, I do consider the expansion and modification 
of hegemonic categories to varying contexts to be the most plausible strat-
egy to arrive at more inclusive understandings, a strategy that amounts to a 
heuristic Eurocentrism, or rather: heuristic Academicentrism. A heuristic 
Eurocentrism is advisable for both historical and hermeneutical reasons, 
as I elaborated elsewhere31 and can summarize here only very briefly. His-
torically, one first needs to acknowledge – in a very sober tone – that one 
cannot write power out of history. Whether one likes it or not, European 
ideas and concepts were widely engaged and appropriated in colonial mo-
dernity. They are more widely shared due to these appropriations, but also 
due to them being only a particular variation of more common aspects. 
With the hegemonic variety, however, one can see further than with any 
other particular variety. This does not mean that Europeans are the sub-
jects and non-Europeans the objects of knowledge. Rather, and adding to 
the fact that there is a lot of non-European in Europe and vice versa, this 
heuristic Eurocentrism is an explorative strategy that precisely inquires, in 
an open-ended process, how particular the hegemonic assumptions and 
understandings one departs from actually are, and accordingly how widely 
they are shared. Thus, one’s own starting-point is transforming in this very 
process, as are the contours of what is considered hegemonic.
31 Florian Zemmin, Modernity in Islamic Tradition. The Concept of ‘Society’ in the Journal 
al-Manar (Cairo, 1898–1940) (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2018), 17–26.
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While historically shaped hegemony might be of a temporal nature, 
the hermeneutic reason for departing from European, English concepts is 
more fundamental. It is due to us, in the secular, English-speaking academy, 
operating with these very concepts. Inevitably, at one point or another in 
one’s research, one will translate the concepts and categories of the objects 
of research into one’s own contemporary categories. Trying to avoid this 
by only using object categories is likely to fail since it will be necessary 
to translate eventually to be understood by contemporary readers. In any 
case, it naively suppresses the implicit starting point of one’s inquiry within 
the secular academy. If this strategy amounts to Academicentrism in the 
end, its aim is to inquire into the genealogy of one’s own assumptions and 
categories and then to discern how far these categories can travel and in 
which regards they ought to be expanded and modified to reflect wider 
conceptual usages and historical realities.
2.2 Alternatives to Eurocentric Sociology from within the  
 English Academy
In order to inquire into actual consequences of post-colonial criticisms of 
Eurocentrism for the production of sociological knowledge, I shall now dis-
cuss at some length an attempt at applying a non-Eurocentric and more in-
clusive sociology to actual case studies, namely James Spickard’s work Alter-
native Sociologies of Religion from 2017.32 Spickard starts from his impression 
that “default sociology” has a too narrow understanding of religion, which 
fails to account for many actual religious experiences and practices in differ-
ent societies. Mainstream sociology, according to Spickard, namely identi-
fies religion rather closely with belief, organization, and moral teachings and 
considers it a distinct sphere of society. He attributes this narrowness to the 
particular European, mainly French, historical experiences of religion that 
shaped sociology, and explores the additional insights that could be gained 
by drawing on alternative sociological approaches, that is, by looking at reli-
gion “through non-Western eyes,” as the book’s subtitle reads.
Spickard considers three alternative approaches to religion, each of 
which he first summarizes and then applies to practical case studies to test 
their potential. These alternatives are a Chinese Confucian one (focus-
ing on ancestor worship and questioning the notion of individuality); the 
32 James V. Spickard, Alternative Sociologies of Religion: Through Non-Western Eyes (New 
York: New York University Press, 2017).
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concept, or rather experience, of religion in rituals by the Navajo tribe in 
the American Southwest; and, concerning the Islamic world, Ibn Khaldun’s 
discussion of religion as guarantor of social integration. For obvious rea-
sons, we shall focus here on Spickard’s usage of Ibn Khaldun, a usage that 
was prompted by “accepting the post-colonial challenge,” as the title of an 
earlier article by Spickard reads.33 While Spickard’s empathetic call for a 
more inclusive and plural understanding of sociology is politically impor- 
tant, it will transpire that he – in the end – very selectively integrates into 
hegemonic sociology alternative perspectives that do not alter the latter’s 
theoretical assumptions.
The Arab judge and philosopher of history, Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406) 
is widely acclaimed for his sociological ideas or even, as some claim, for 
having been the founder of sociology. I shall discuss such characterizations 
in greater detail in the following section. Here, it matters how Spickard 
is making use of Ibn Khaldun. In his famous Muqaddima, Ibn Khaldun 
distinguished between Bedouin and cultured life (according to Spickard in 
the sense of Weberian ideal types)34 and inquired into the reasons for the 
supposed cyclical alteration of both types of collective life. The motor and 
sustainer of collective life for Ibn Khaldun is ʿaṣabiyya (group solidarity). 
ʿAṣabiyya is predominantly based on kinship and is strongest among Bed-
ouin peoples, not only because of external threats but also as an internal 
motivator. ʿAṣabiyya strengthens the solidarity and force of a collectivity 
and allows it to advance in cultured life and to overpower a more advanced 
collectivity. However, after a given time, usually four generations, this col-
lectivity will be overpowered itself, for its ʿaṣabiyya inevitably gets weaker 
under the conditions of cultured life. While ʿaṣabiyya in the primary form 
of kinship naturally weakens with the growth of a collectivity, according to 
Ibn Khaldun, it can to some extent be substituted with religion. The Arabs 
more than others needed such an alternative source of ʿaṣabiyya, because 
of their savagery. Islam provided that source, which allowed for a wider 
integration of the Arab’s collectivity. However, it too could not completely 
halt decline, which is inevitable in Ibn Khaldun’s cyclical understanding of 
history. Spickard finds special interest in Ibn Khaldun connecting in his 
33 James V. Spickard, “Accepting the Post-colonial Challenge: Theorizing a Khaldûnian Ap-
proach to the Marian Apparition at Medjugorje,” Critical Research on Religion 1, no. 2 
(2013): 158–76.
34 Spickard, Alternative Sociologies, 140.
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core concept of  ʿ aṣabiyya religion and ethnicity – “two things that standard 
Western sociology (and the sociology of religion) typically keeps apart.”35 
Spickard suggests that an alignment of religion and ethnicity would allow 
for a more adequate understanding of recent conflicts in Muslim societies.
To test how “a Khaldūnian sociology (might) work in practice,”36 
Spickard applies it to two cases. The first is Medjugorje in former Yugo-
slavia. Medjugorje was visited by different confessional groups as a site of 
a supposed Marian experience. The ensuing ethnic-religious conflict in 
Yugoslavia is better understood, Spickard suggests, if one views with Ibn 
Khaldun the heightened religiosity displayed in Medjugorje as also con-
tributing to group solidarity and therefore to later conflicts:
Unlike the standard Western approach, a Khaldūnian sociology would not 
be surprised by the eruption of communal violence. Intense group-feeling  
can stimulate conflict with outsiders. It does not matter whether the feel-
ing comes from religion or from ethnic ties. In short, a Khaldūnian ap-
proach is not surprised by the eruption of ethnic conflict at a religious 
pilgrimage site.37
Such a Khaldunian approach also avoids standard sociology’s false oppo-
sition of static tradition and dynamic modernity, Spickard argues.38 In his 
second case study, Spickard argues that Europeans joining the Islamic State 
as fighters “are clearly driven by a form of group solidarity: one of ideology, 
not of origin.”39 These people arguably lacked a sense of ʿaṣabiyya in their 
home societies and thus resorted to religious solidarity in the imagined 
community of the Islamic umma.40 Ibn Khaldun, according to Spickard, 
made a similarly fruitful “theoretical move” as Olivier Roy in his analysis 
of European jihadis, namely, “[h]e has looked to people’s concrete social 
situations to see what kind of social solidarity they can develop.”41
Now, while one could also discuss the plausibility of Spickard’s read-
ing of Ibn Khaldun, more crucial is whether the resort to Ibn Khaldun 
actually improved sociological analysis, and in which sense it made for 
35 Spickard, Alternative Sociologies, 153.
36 Spickard, 159.
37 Spickard, 168.
38 Notably, he also discusses the limits of this approach, which obviously cannot account for 





an alternative sociology. Whereas Spickard argued that “looking through 
non-Western eyes” brings into sight aspects that a Eurocentric gaze is mis-
sing, it seems rather clear that these aspects were visible before turning to 
Ibn Khaldun and that Spickard appropriated the latter very selectively to 
highlight those aspects and support their analysis with a conceptual tool-
kit. Thus, for example, it did not take Ibn Khaldun to see structural com-
monalities between religion and ethnicity. Comparisons between Islamism 
and ethnic nationalism testify to this. Spickard is thus less formulating 
a “Khaldūnian approach,” but rather is appropriating Ibn Khaldun from 
within contemporary sociological discourse to make a critical intervention 
that would have been equally possible without reference to Ibn Khaldun. 
Spickard, in the end, offers less an alternative sociology with alternative 
premises, theories or methods, but rather a call for critical self-reflectivity 
of sociology, and for incorporating non-Western intellectual resources in 
the construction of a more inclusive sociology, appropriate for “living in 
the global world.”42 Spickard’s sociological appropriation of Ibn Khaldun is 
thus primarily a political move.
This also holds true for the works of Sayid Farid Alatas, the one schol-
ar who most intensely and sophistically engaged with Ibn Khaldun in a 
sociological perspective.43 Alatas applied selected concepts of Ibn Khal-
dun to several case studies.44 He notably did so by combining Khaldunian 
concepts with others from modern sociology. For example, he combined 
the concept of ʿaṣabiyya with Marx’ theory of the mode of production to 
explain the rise and decline of the Safavid dynasty (1501–1772) in conjunc-
tion with its political economy.45 Moreover, Alatas made sure not to simply 
equate Ibn Khaldun’s thoughts with modern sociology, but to situate them 
in Ibn Khaldun’s historical context and thought-world. Overall, it becomes 
clear from Alatas’ œuvre that he is consciously appropriating selected 
42 Spickard, 251. Indeed, despite the book’s title, Spickard argues more for a global socio- 
logy, than for different alternative sociologies. He does not argue that different societies 
require different sociologies, even though he suggests Ibn Khaldun is especially fruitful 
in the analysis of Islamic societies because of his own Islamic attitude.
43 There is no point in listing Alatas’s numerous works here. For a rightfully appreciative 
summary, see: Nurullah Ardıç, “Khaldunian Studies Today: The Contributions of Syed 
Farid Alatas,” Journal for Historical Sociology 30, no. 1 (2017).
44 For a collection, see: Syed Farid Alatas, Applying Ibn Khaldūn: The Recovery of a Lost 
Tradition in Sociology (London: Routledge, 2014).
45 First in: Syed Farid Alatas, “A Khaldunian Perspective on the Dynamics of Asiatic 
Societies,” Comparative Civilizations Review 29 (1993).
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aspects of Ibn Khaldun’s thoughts to make them fruitful for contempo-
rary sociology. However, Alatas sometimes uses phraseology that suggest 
an ahistorical or teleological reading, such as when he characterizes Ibn 
Khaldun’s writings as “sociological in nature”46 or stresses that a “sociology 
of sorts”47 was practiced outside the West and before modernity. I would 
insist on the fact that ‘sociological’ aspects of Ibn Khaldun were only iden-
tified with hindsight of and from within modern sociology – as the read-
er might suspect from my introductory remarks and as will become ever 
clearer later. What is certain for now is that after several decades of work 
on and with Ibn Khaldun, Alatas has in fact managed to firmly inscribe Ibn 
Khaldun into the sociological canon.48
If expanding the sociological canon to include Ibn Khaldun was pri-
marily a political move, it is a desirable one. First, let us not forget that the 
earlier construction and maintenance of that canon also had an inherent 
political dimension. The rather narrow and allegedly self-sufficient under-
standing of European sociology was itself borne out of a contingent histori- 
cal moment. In this regard, it is worth noting that several European schol-
ars around the turn of the 19th century had in fact included Ibn Khaldun 
within sociology, even though sometimes primarily for validating their 
own sociological approach.49 In general, as Bhambra had also forcefully 
argued, European sociological thought did not plainly evolve in a self- 
sufficient Europe, but was inspired and shaped by encounters.50 This is to 
say that a more plural sociological canon is not only desirable in our global 
age, but also has historical arguments to show for, which will come increas-
ingly into view as paradigms of national or civilizational history are being 
replaced by global and entangled history.
46 Alatas, Applying Ibn Khaldūn, 9.
47 Alatas, 154.
48 Syed Farid Alatas, “Ibn Khaldūn,” in The Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Major Social 
Theorists: Classical Social Theorists, vol. 1, ed. George Ritzer and Jeffrey Stepinsky 
(Chichester: Wiley & Sons, 2011); Syed Farid Alatas and Vineeta Sinha, Sociological 
Theory beyond the Canon (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).
49 See: Ludwig Gumplowicz, “Ibn Chaldun, ein arabischer Soziologe des XIV. Jahrhun-
derts,” in Soziologische Essays (Innsbruck: Verlag der Wagnerschen Univ.-Buchhandlung, 
1899 [1898]).
50 In 1977, Pankoke had already pointed to the importance of discovering the “new world” 
for the “sociological imagination”; see: Eckart Pankoke, “Fortschritt und Komplexität. 
Die Anfänge moderner Sozialwissenschaft in Deutschland,” in Studien zum Beginn der 
modernen Welt, ed. Reinhart Koselleck (Stuttgart: Klett Cotta, 1977).
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Moreover, the expansion of the sociological canon goes along with an 
enlargement and diversification of the conceptual toolkit that can play out 
fruitfully at a theoretical level. Thus, the concept of ʿaṣabiyya might, once 
established, become equally as fruitful as other sociological conceptuali- 
zations of social cohesion or solidarity, even though it was included in so-
ciological theory primarily for political motives. To claim that the appli-
cability of ʿaṣabiyya is confined to Arab or Islamic societies would be to 
fall into the culturalist trap. One may however ask, given that sociology is 
“both universal and particular,” whether ʿaṣabiyya helps to express the uni-
versal idea of group formation in a particular conceptual framework, in the 
same way as ‘social cohesion’ does. In this sense, and following the more 
productive understanding of indigenous sociology not as separate socio- 
logies, but as variations of common sociology,51 both ʿaṣabiyya and ‘social 
cohesion’ are indigenous concepts. In other words, ʿaṣabiyya and ‘social 
cohesion’ are particular guiding ideas to address the same underlying ref-
erence problem. The link to ‘secularity’ as one particular guiding idea also 
appears rather clearly here, but will be spelled out in the fifth section.
3 Arabic Propositions of an Islamic Sociology
3.1 Sociology in (Post-)Colonial Arab Countries
While the history of sociology as an academic discipline in the Arab world 
leaves much to be explored, two aspects are rather clearly established: first, 
the centrality of Egypt in the founding stage of sociology; and second, the 
influence of European colonial power and of European sociologists. I high-
light European influence here also because it became the target of Islamic 
Sociology. It should be clear that European ideas were not plainly adopted 
by Arab actors or even implemented simply as part of a colonial project. In 
fact, the local demand for social sciences partly stemmed from aims at cre-
ating national sovereignty.52 Moreover, in acts of creative appropriations, 
Arab sociologists also re-configured the thought of towering figures such 
51 For a critical discussion of different understandings of indigenizing social sciences, see: 
Syed Farid Alatas, “Indigenization: Features and Problems,” in Asian Anthropology, ed. 
Jan van Bremen, Eyal Ben-Ari, and Syed Farid Alatas (Abingdon: Routledge, 2005).
52 Alain Roussillon, “Projet colonial et traditions scientifiques: aux origines de la sociologie 
égyptienne,” in D’un Orient l’autre: les métamorphoses successives des perceptions et connaissances, 
vol. 2: identifications, ed. CEDEJ (Paris: Editions du CNRS, 1991), esp. 364; Ahmad Zayid, 
“Seventy Years of Sociology in Egypt,” Cairo Papers in Social Science 18, no. 3 (1995): 48.
21
as Durkheim in fundamental ways.53 It should also be clear that the fol-
lowing sketch cannot account for differences between individual coun-
tries, but only highlights the most significant and general trends. These 
qualifications in mind, the influence of European, initially mainly French 
and later Anglo-Saxon sociology in Arab countries remains crucial to the 
discipline’s development; as does the centrality of Egypt.
Prior to its institutionalization, European sociological ideas were al-
ready present in the Arab world, and specifically in Egypt. Saint Simonians 
had brought their program of social engineering to Egypt in the 1830s, 
and did gain a certain influence in the following decades.54 Attention to 
societal issues was a more widespread concern at the time, and overviews 
of the history of modern social thought in Arabic more broadly tend to 
begin with Islamic reformers of the 19th century,55 who some Egyptian so-
ciologists consider as crucial for the shaping of their discipline.56 European 
‘sociology,’ explicitly designated as such, was first discussed, appropriated 
and disseminated in Arabic journals, which mushroomed from the 1870s 
onwards. Most important in this regard was the journal al-Muqtataf, edited 
by Syrian Christians and moved from Beirut to Cairo in 1884;57 but also the 
most prominent Islamic journal, al-Manar, validated sociology as a science 
necessary for the present age and referred to European sociologists in a 
positive, if superficial manner.58 Most prominent among these was Herbert 
53 See, for example, Ali al-Wafi’s appropriation of Durkheim: Alain Roussillon, “La 
représentation de l’identité par les discours fondateurs de la sociologie turque et égyp-
tienne: Ziya Gökalp et ʿAli ʿAbd al-Wahid Wafi,” in Modernisation et mobilisation so-
ciale II, Egypte-Turquie, ed. CEDEJ (Cairo: CEDEJ – Égypte/Soudan, 1992), http://books.
openedition.org/cedej/1047. Omnia El Shakry worked on the formation of the social 
sciences in Egypt, focusing not on sociology, but on anthropology, human geography, 
and demography: Omnia El Shakry, The Great Social Laboratory: Subjects of Knowledge 
in Colonial and Postcolonial Egypt (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007). El Shakry 
somehow overstretches the argument though: while she argues that Egyptians played an 
active role in the very construction of these sciences, her sources instead suggest creative 
appropriations of these sciences.
54 Muhammad T. ʿIsa, Atbaʿ Saint-Simon: Falsafatuhum al-Ijtimaʿiyya wa-Tatbiquha fi Misr 
(Cairo: Matbaʿat Jamiʿat al-Qahira, 1957).
55 ʿIzzat Qarni, Tarikh al-Fikr al-Siyasi wa-l-Ijtimaʿi fi Misr al-Haditha (1834–1914) (Cairo: 
al-Hayʾa al-Misriyya al-ʿAmma li-l-Kitab, 2006).
56 Roussillon, “Projet colonial,” 362.
57 See, for example: Nasim Efendi Birbari, “al-Susiyulujiyya ay ʿIlm al-Ijtimaʿ al-Insani,” 
al-Muqtataf 21, no. 8, 9, 11 (1897).
58 Zemmin, Modernity in Islamic Tradition, 367–73.
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Spencer,59 who was also the central source for the first Arabic monograph 
on sociology, published in 1924/25 by Niqula al-Haddad.60
It was also in 1925 that the first department of sociology was estab-
lished at the Egyptian University in Cairo,61 the year of its nationaliza-
tion. The institution was founded in 1908 as a private institution. It took 
non-religious European universities as its model, and European scholars 
and orientalists also influenced the project directly.62 It is no contradiction 
to stress that this orientation at European models and ideas was an attempt 
at improving their own capability to master the modern world and to gain 
sovereignty. Concerning sociology, it nevertheless holds true that it was 
European scholars who offered the first courses in sociology from 1913 
and then also held the chair of sociology established in 1925. The depart-
ment for sociology at the Egyptian University was closed in 1934, and only 
reopened after the Revolution of 1952.
The first Egyptian to then hold the chair in sociology was ʿAli ʿAbd 
al-Wafi, who had studied in Paris and was visibly influenced by Durkheim, 
but at the same time highlighted the sociological contribution of Ibn 
Khaldun.63 He thereby did not attempt to formulate a particular Arab or 
Islamic Sociology, but rather meant to legitimize the novel discipline of 
sociology. The validity of sociological approaches was indeed anything but 
obvious, not least when it came to religious subjects. This shows up, for ex-
ample, in the scandal around Mansur Fahmi, who had been the first Egyp-
tian to obtain a degree in sociology in 1913 in Paris under the supervision 
of Lévy-Bruhl. On learning of Fahmi’s arguments on the role of women in 
Islam, the Egyptian University, which had sponsored his studies in Par-
is, tried to prevent the defense of Fahmi’s thesis. While this did not suc-
ceed, the University banned Fahmi from teaching.64 Four years after Fahmi 
59 See also: Marwa ElShakry, “Spencer’s Arabic Readers,” in Global Spencerism: The Com-
munication and Appropriation of a British Evolutionist, ed. Bernard Lightman (Leiden: 
Brill, 2015).
60 Niqula al-Haddad, ʿIlm al-Ijtimaʿ: Hayat al-Hayʾa al-Ijtimaʿiyya wa-Tatawwuruha (Cai-
ro: al-Matbaʿa al-ʿAsriyya, 1924/25).
61 From 1940 to 1952, it was named “King Fuaʾd University” and since then “Cairo University.”
62 For the history of the university from 1908 to 1952, see: Donald Malcolm Reid, Cairo Uni-
versity and the Making of Modern Egypt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); 
for the influence of orientalists in particular: Donald Malcolm Reid, “Cairo University and 
the Orientalists,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 19, no. 1 (1987).
63 Roussillon, “La représentation de l’identité.”
64 Reid, “Cairo University and the Orientalists,” 64–66.
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and also in Paris, Taha Husayn defended his PhD thesis on Ibn Khaldun, 
written under the supervision of Emile Durkheim and the orientalist Paul 
Casanova.65 Husayn, who considered Egypt to be part of European culture, 
placed Ibn Khaldun as an oriental outside of modern sociological thought. 
This again illustrates the identity politics involved in constructing a socio-
logical tradition. According to Alain Roussillon, a Durkheimian approach 
remained dominant in the universities, while private associations more 
concerned with the societal application of knowledge were oriented more 
towards Anglo-Saxon approaches.66
The first formation of sociology in colonial Egypt remained rather limi- 
ted in scope, but did impact the much wider establishment of sociology 
in the newly independent Arab nation states of the 1950s and 60s. Cairo 
University had been a model for a number of newly founded universities 
in other Arab countries, and Egyptian teachers were in high demand.67 To-
day, sociology and other social sciences are present at the majority of uni-
versities in Arab countries.68 The expansion of higher education in Arab 
countries of course mirrors developments in Europe, as does the influence 
of Marxist teachings from the 1960s onwards. The Egyptian president 
Nasser characterized revolution as “the science of complete societal trans-
formation (ʿilm al-taghyīr al-ijtimāʿī al-shāmil)”69 and sociologists were 
expected to help with this task. The link between sociology and socialism, 
which illustrates the political dimension of sociology, is apparent in Arabic 
and European countries alike: for example, Niqula Haddad not only au-
thored the first Arabic monograph on Sociology in 1925, but also the first 
book on Socialism (Ishtirakiyya) five years earlier.70 In Morocco, the first 
generation of sociologists from the 1960s combined Marxist convictions 
65 Taha Husayn, La philosophie sociale d’Ibn-Khaldoun (Paris: A. Pedone, 1917); Taha Husayn, 
Falsafat Ibn Khaldun al-Ijtimaʿiyya: Tahlil wa-Naqd (Cairo: Matbaʿat al-Iʿtimad, 1925).
66 Roussillon, “Projet colonial.”
67 Katharina Lange, Zurückholen, was uns gehört: Indigenisierungstendenzen in der arabi-
schen Ethnologie (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2005), 43–44.
68 See: Mohammed Bamyeh, ed., Social Sciences in the Arab World: Forms of Presence [First 
Report by the Arab Social Science Monitor] (Beirut: Arab Council for the Social Sciences, 
2015), 17.
69 Jamal ʿAbd al-Nasir, quoted in: Alain Roussillon, “Sociologie et société en Egypte: le con-
tournement des intellectuels par l’Etat,” in Les intellectuels et le pouvoir, ed. T. Al-Bishri 
et al. (Cairo: CEDEJ, 1996), 95. Compare: Judith Zimmermann, ‘Sozialismus ist aktive 
Soziologie.’ Religion, Politik und Gesellschaft im Leben und Werk von Robert Hertz (PhD 
thesis, Leipzig University, 2017).
70 Niqula al-Haddad, al-Ishtirakiyya. (n.g.: Dar al-Mada li-l-Thaqafa wa-l-Nashr, 2002 [1920]).
24
and criticism of colonial power in their activist understanding of sociolo-
gy.71 It is certainly no coincidence that it is generally “difficult to imagine a 
Nazi or Stalinist sociologist and almost impossible to imagine a racist so-
ciologist.”72 If sociology in general not only analyzes, but also helps to order 
society, authoritarian regimes in the Arab world aimed at using sociology 
directly for their socialist policies.
The lack of political freedom continues, to varying degrees, to restrict 
the practice and quality of sociology in Arab countries, as does the under-
funding of the university system. Political and economic restraints have al-
ready been criticized for half a century and are still rightly criticized today.73 
The translation of sociological works into Arabic also arose from pragmatic 
concerns: While the first Arab sociologists were versed in French or English 
and had received their education abroad, the expansion of sociology and the 
vastly increasing number of students created a demand for translating socio-
logical works into Arabic.74 Still, translations into Arabic also had a political 
aspect when considered as part of nationalizing or Arabizing sciences. It is 
71 Muhammad al-Idrisi, “Tadris al-Susiyulujiyya fi al-Maghrib: al-Muʾassasat al-Bahthiyya 
wa-Rihan al-Maʾssasa al-Ibistimulujiyya li-l-Mumarisa al-ʿiImiyya,” al-Majlis al-ʿArabi 
li-l-ʿUlum al-Ijtimaʿiyya: Silsilat Awraq al-ʿAmal 1 (2017), 3–4.
72 Alain Touraine, “The End of the ‘Social,’” in Comparing Modernities. Pluralism versus 
Homogenity, ed. Eliezer Ben-Rafael and Yitzhak Sternberg (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 232.
73 See, for example, several contributions in the following three volumes from 1984, 1986 
and 2014: Ahmad Khalifa and Lutfi Suhair, eds., Ishkaliyat al-ʿUlum al-Ijtimaʿiyya fi al-Wa-
tan al-ʿArabi (Beirut: Dar al-Tanwir, 1984); Markaz Dirasat al-Wahda al-ʿArabiyya, Nahw 
ʿIlm Ijtimaʿ ʿArabi: ʿIlm al-Ijtimaʿ wa-l-Mushkilat al-ʿArabiyya al-Rahina (Beirut: Markaz 
Dirasat al-Wahda al-ʿArabiyya, 1986); Sari Hanafi, Nouria Benghabrit-Remaoun, and 
Medjahdi Mustafa, eds., Mustaqbal al-ʿUlum al-Ijtimaʿiyya fi al-Watan al-ʿArabi (Beirut: 
Center for Arab Unity Studies, 2014). See as additional glimpses into these structural is-
sues: Sari Hanafi and Rigas Arvanitis, “The Marginalization of the Arab Language in Social 
Science: Structural Constraints and Dependency by Choice,” Current Sociology 62, no. 5 
(2014); Saha Hamzawy and Samya Kawashi, “Ishkalat ʿIlm al-Ijtimaʿ fi al-Watan al-ʿArabi: 
Qiraʾat Tahliliyya li-Iʿtirafat baʿd ʿUlamaʾ al-Ijtimaʿ al-ʿArab,” Majallat al-ʿUlum al-Insan-
iyya wa-l-Ijtimaʿiyya 28 (2017); Khaled Fahmy, “The Crisis of the Humanities in Egypt,” 
Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 37, no. 1 (2017).
74 In the early years of the Egyptian University, demands at Arabizing the institution had 
already been voiced (Reid, Cairo University, 99–100). A bibliography of Arab sociological 
works, compiled in 1979 with the aim of strengthening Arabic sociology, comprises no 
fewer than 5153 titles: Muhammad Fathi ʿ Abd al-Hadi, al-Dalil al-Bibliyujrafi li-l-Intaj al-
Fikri al-ʿArabi fi al-ʿUlum al-Ijtimaʿiyya (ʿIlm al-Ijtimaʿ wa-l-Anthrubulujiyya wa-l-Fulk-
lur) (Cairo: al-Munazzama al-ʿArabiyya li-l-Tarbiya wa-l-Thaqafa wa-l-ʿUlum, 1979). As 
a bibliographical resource, see now: Ahmad Zayid and Muhammad al-Jawhari, al-Intaj 
al-ʿArabi fi ʿIlm al-Ijtimaʿ: Qaʾima Bibliyughrafiyya Mashruha [vol. 1: 1924–1995; vol. 2 
1995–2000] (Cairo: Markaz al-Buhuth wa-l-Dirasat al-Ijtimaʿiyya, 2001, 2003).
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crucial to bear these more structural and pragmatic dimensions in mind, lest 
we suggest that the criticism of sociology as Eurocentric, to which we now 
turn, is the only aspect under which the state of sociology in Arab countries 
and its aspired improvement has been discussed.
3.2 Arabic Criticisms of Hegemonic Sociology
Despite wider efforts at Arabizing sociology there exist only two Arabic 
monographs that actually try and formulate an Arab sociology,75 and both 
authors would later in fact turn to “Islamic Sociology.” Salih al-Fawwal, 
who in 1982 had posited an indissoluble link between Arab and Islamic 
identity in his Introduction to Arab and Islamic Sociology,76 followed up 
with an Introduction to Islamic Sociology in 2000.77 Maʿn Khalil ʿUmar 
granted a central role to Islam in his book Towards an Arab Theory of So-
ciology from 1989, but accorded primacy to Arab society and culture.78 
Twenty-five years later, ʿUmar’s book was republished under the title of 
Islamic Sociology, with only very minor changes, primarily replacing “Arab” 
with “Islamic” and “Arabs” with “Muslims.”79 The shift from “Arab” to “Is-
lamic Sociology” indicates two things: first, the construction of a sociologi- 
cal tradition greatly hinges on the society one envisions (primarily as Arab 
or as Islamic); second, the paradigm of an “Arab sociology” was plausible 
in conjunction with pan-Arab politics and the vision for an Arab society,80 
but had run its course rather quickly, whereas “Islam” continues to be a 
more widely shared concept of order.
75 A third was published in German, but quickly debunked as unacademic, and seemingly 
without wider reception: Abdulkader Irabi, Arabische Soziologie: Studien zur Geschichte 
und Gesellschaft des Islam (Darmstadt: WBG, 1989); Werner Ende, “Arabische Soziologie. 
Studien zur Geschichte und Gesellschaft des Islam by Abdulkader Irabi,” Die Welt des 
Islams 31, no. 2 (1991). 
76 Salih Mustafa al-Fawwal, al-Tarikh al-Nazari li-ʿIlm al-Ijtimaʿ; vol. 2: al-Muqaddima li-
ʿIlm al-Ijtimaʿ al-ʿArabi wa-l-Islami (Cairo: Dar al-Fikr al-ʿArabi, 1982).
77 Salah Mustafa al-Fawwal, al-Madkhal li-ʿIlm al-Ijtimaʿ al-Islami (Cairo: Dar Gharuba li-
l-Tibaʿa wa-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawziʿ, 2000).
78 Maʿn Khalil ʿUmar, Nahwa Nazariyya ʿArabiyya fi ʿIlm al-Ijtimaʿ (ʿAmman: Dar M. Lawi, 
1991), referred to from here on as Arab Theory of Sociology; also published, seemingly 
identical, as: Maʿn Khalil ʿUmar, Nahwa ʿIlm Ijtimaʿ ʿArabi (ʿAmman: Dar Majdalawi 
li-l-Nashr, 1991).
79 Maʿn Khalil ʿUmar, ʿIlm al-Ijtimaʿ al-Islami (n.g.: Dar al-Zahraʾ li-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawziʿ, 2013).
80 Sociological works positing Arab society as their frame of reference could of course be 
included in a wider understanding of “Arab Sociology”; see, for example: ʿ Ali Ahmad ʿ Isa, 
al-Mujtamaʿ al-ʿArabi: Dirasat Ijtimaʿiyya ʿAmaliyya (Cairo: Dar al-Maʿarif, 1961).
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Propositions of an Islamic Sociology are indeed much more numer-
ous than those of an Arab Sociology, and they also extend to the present. 
The twenty Arabic monographs entitled “Islamic Sociology (ʿIlm al-Ijtimaʿ 
al-Islami)” that I am aware of were published between 1970 and 2013. To 
these, one could add other works not carrying Islamic Sociology in their 
title, but sharing in the fundamental criticism of Western81 sociology from 
an Islamic perspective, such as the Islamic School of Sociology,82 an Islamic 
View on Sociology,83 a New Islamic Understanding of Sociology,84 The Islamic 
Formation of Sociology85 or Sociology between Islamic and Foreign Con-
science.86 By fundamental criticism, I here mean a challenge to the very 
epistemic foundations on which sociology rests. This challenge is also for-
mulated in the two English books presenting an Islamic Sociology.87 Propo- 
sitions of an Islamic Sociology that posit a distinct Islamic epistemology 
share a concern with broader attempts to Islamize sciences. The Interna-
tional Institute for Islamic Thought (IIIT), founded in Herndon (Virginia) 
in 1981 is the most prominent location of such attempts,88 which were also 
promoted in and by Saudi Arabia in the 1970s and 80s.89 While Arabic 
81 It is the proponents of an Islamic Sociology themselves who are identifying a distinct and 
hegemonic Western sociology, which they are then criticizing to various degrees.
82 Mustafa Muhammad Hasanayn, al-Madkhal ila al-Madrasa al-Islamiyya fi ʿIlm al-Ijtimaʿ 
(Cairo: Matbaʿat al-Kilani, 1975).
83 Talʿat Ghannam, ʿIlm al-Ijtimaʿ min Manzur Islami (Cairo: Matbaʿat al-Fajr al-Jadid, 1987).
84 Muhamamd ʿUlwan, Mafhum Islami Jadid li-ʿIlm al-Ijtimaʿ; al-Juzʾ al-Awwal: al-Jamaʿa 
(Cairo: Dar wa-Maktabat al-Hilal/Dar al-Shuruq li-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawziʿ, 2007).
85 Mansur Zuwayyid al-Matiri, al-Siyagha al-Islamiyya li-ʿIlm al-Ijtimaʿ (Qatar: Riʾasat 
al-Mahakim al-Sharʿiyya wa-l-Shuʾun al-Diniyya, 1992).
86 Muhammad Ahmad Bayyumi, ʿIlm al-Ijtimaʿ bayn al-Waʿy al-Islami wa-l-Waʿy 
al-Mughtarib (Alexandria: Dar al-Maʿrifa al-Jamiʿiyya, 1993). Bayyumi, an Egyptian 
scholar, had gained his PhD at Temple University in 1976 with a Weberian reading of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, which is noticeably sympathetic to the movement: Muhammad 
Ahmad Bayyumi, “The Islamic Ethic of Social Justice and the Spirit of Modernization: 
an application of Weber’s thesis to the relationship between religious values and social 
change in modern Egypt.” (PhD thesis, Philadelphia, Temple University, 1976).
87 Ilyas Ba-Yunus and Farid Ahmad, Islamic Sociology: An Introduction (London: Hodder & 
Stoughton, 1985); and, in a much more populist and superficial manner: Farid Younos, 
Principles of Islamic Sociology (Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2011).
88 Stenberg distinguishes four sub-trends in the Islamization of Science, of which the IIIT 
represents one: Leif Stenberg, The Islamization of Science: Four Muslim Positions Develop-
ing an Islamic Modernity (Lund: Novapress, 1996).
89 For example: Baqidir, Abu Bakr Ahmad, Aslamat al-ʿUlum al-Ijtimaʿiyya (Jidda: Jamiʿat 
al-Malik ʿAbd al-ʿAziz, 1981). For the development of social sciences in Saudi Arabia, 
see: ʿAbdallah bin Hussayn al-Khalifa, “al-Takwin al-ʿIlmi fi ʿIlm al-Ijtimaʿ: al-Saʿudiyya,” 
in Mustaqbal al-ʿUlum al-Ijtimaʿiyya fi al-Watan al-ʿArabi, ed. Sari Hanafi, Nouria 
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propositions of an Islamic Sociology have to be viewed together with these 
broader intellectual trends, as well as with post-colonial critiques of Euro-
centrism formulated in English or French, the authors themselves rarely 
make these connections explicit.90
Concerning chronological trends within propositions of an Islamic So-
ciology, Kerim Edipoǧlu identified an “increasing degree of disconnection 
from Western models of thought”91 between the years 1980 and 2000. Edi-
poǧlu depicts this as a shift from “apologetic” to “confrontative” approaches, 
in the sense of ideal types. It seems logical that the failure of apologetic 
attempts to actually improve sociology and society gave rise to efforts at 
more fundamentally rethinking sociology and its underlying epistemo- 
logy. That being said, also early on, there existed efforts to establish Islamic 
Sociology as a discipline of its own, separate from Western sociology, as is 
also noted by Edipoǧlu. Moreover, also the apologetic works dealt with by 
Edipoǧlu argued for certain particularities to Islamic society and thus to 
Islamic Sociology and asked for a modification of (Western) sociology. In 
any case, our aim here is not a detailed reconstruction of the field of Islamic 
Sociology and its evolvement, but rather identifying central lessons for he-
gemonic sociology and its potential expansion.
Under this aim, the following three sections present two rather differ-
ent propositions of an Islamic Sociology, next to ʿUmar’s above-mentioned 
Arab Theory of Sociology, which was republished as Islamic Sociology. In 
an ideal-typical sense, ʿUmar represents the attempt to merely indigenize 
sociology in and for Arab society, without challenging the premises, theo-
ries or methods of mainstream sociology. This challenge is most strong in 
Nabil al-Samaluti’s vision of an Islamic Sociology, which confronts Western 
sociology outright. Samiya Mustafa al-Khashshab’s work, in turn, can be 
read as complementing hegemonic sociology, not least by showing that secu- 
lar, sociological inquiry is also possible within a transcendental frame-
work. Next to the relation to hegemonic, secular sociology, the following 
Benghabrit-Remaoun, and Medjahdi Mustafa (Beirut: Center for Arab Unity Studies, 
2014).
90 For an Arabic publication coming out of the IIIT, see: Mihwar Basha, ʿAbd al-Halim, ʿIlm 
al-Ijtimaʿ fi al-ʿAlam al-ʿArabi min al-Naqd ila al-Taʾsis: Nahwa ʿIlm al-ʿUmran al-Islami 
(Herndon, Virginia: International Institute for Islamic Thought, 1981).
91 Kerim Edipoǧlu, “Islamisierung der Soziologie oder Soziologisierung des Islam? Indi-
genisierungsansätze in Malaysia, Iran und der arabischen Welt,” (PhD thesis, Tübingen 
University, 2006), 222, transl. FZ.
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presentation will focus on the (re)construction of an Arab or Islamic socio-
logical heritage or tradition.
3.3 Indigenizing Hegemonic Sociology: Maʿn Khalil ʿUmar
Born in 1939 in Iraq, ʿUmar obtained his PhD in the United States, worked 
at several Arab universities and published more than a dozen introductory 
works to different fields of sociology. In his Arab Theory of Sociology, he 
stresses that he does not call for a distinct Arab sociology. This rests on 
his argument that Arab society is not so different as to require a particular 
sociology. Rather, like every society, the Arab society shares certain aspects 
with other societies and has its particular characteristics, ʿUmar maintains. 
His intent to highlight Arab contributions to sociological thought is based 
on the premise that sociology is a recent science that was only established 
after the First World War, but that Arabs had been reflecting upon society 
before. Moreover, other than modern European and US-American sociolo- 
gists, they have been focusing less on the characteristics of their own so-
ciety, but instead have dealt with human society in general. It is also for 
this reason that the heritage of Arab sociological thought can be benefitted 
from today.92
ʿUmar however gives a culturalist twist to this seemingly universal un-
derstanding of sociological thought, which leads him to claim superiority 
of Arab over Western sociology: the Arab sociological heritage remains 
alive and relevant today since Arab society has deep roots and unchanging 
cultural characteristics.93 Western sociologists, by contrast, could not build 
on a given tradition, which is why they had to appropriate the heritages of 
other cultures.94 According to ʿUmar, most Arab sociologists neglect their 
own heritage and only orient themselves to modern Western sociological 
theories; theories that do not conform to the reality of their own societies.95 
The Arab sociological heritage, in turn, is relevant for this present reality, 
for it dealt with aspects that continue to shape Arab society, chief among 
them family and blood relations.96 To uncover this heritage, which has al-
legedly remained alive in the Arab unconsciousness, is to ʿUmar a means 






to both understand the current Arab society more adequately and also to 
reform it.97
In the end, ʿUmar combines these universal and particular lines of ar-
gument, when he says that returning to the Arab sociological heritage is a 
means to supporting broader sociological theories:
There is no doubt that returning to our sociological heritage (al-rujūʿ ilā 
turāthinā al-ijtimāʿī) will bring us to the fundamental bases of contemporary 
Arab societal life (al-qawāʿid al-asāsiyya li-l-ḥayāt al-ijtimāʿiyya al-ʿarabiyya 
al-muʿāṣira) and spare us from adopting the heritage of other societies and 
employ it in the study of our present social reality, since [that other heritage] 
differs from our reality in its tradition, its structure and its orders. This is not 
a call for separation from the courses of theoretical sociology (majrayāt ʿilm 
al-ijtimāʿ al-naẓarī), but in our conviction it will make us support the theo-
ries of sociology by a heritage (narfid naẓariyāt ʿilm al-ijtimāʿ bi-turāth) rich 
in experiences which continue to have an influence and remaining power  
in contemporary Arab society; and we will have a share in laying the funda-
mental bricks of Arab sociology or a sociological theory that concerns the 
past, the present and its future manifestations.98
In the first chapter, ʿUmar presents the structure and characteristics of the 
Arab society, starting in pre-Islamic times. The main effect of Islam, accord-
ing to him, was to unite the different societal structures in one comprehensive 
order (niẓām wāḥid).99 The Arab personality (al-shakhṣiyya al-ʿarabiyya), 
which remains the primary reference for ʿUmar, subsequently carried the 
characteristics of the Islamic religion.100 In the second chapter, ʿUmar then 
constructs an Arab sociological heritage, which arguably emerged during 
the height of Arab civilization between the 8th and 13th centuries. The third 
chapter presents different methods used by ancient Arab sociologists. In the 
fourth chapter, ʿUmar first discusses central topics of sociology today, and 
then shows how the Arab sociological heritage, in comparison with Western 
theories, is relevant to these topics and can thereby enrich Western theories 
of sociology. ʿ Umar finds that the ancient Arabs – whose thinking, according 
to him, qualifies as academic in the modern sense –101 had dealt with these 







Concerning our two main aspects of interest – first, the relation of alter-
native sociologies to hegemonic sociology and its normativity and, second, 
the pre-modern sociological references it includes – we note: ʿUmar, first, 
understands himself as participating in modern sociological discourse and 
does not at all question its epistemology or normativity, nor its theories or 
approaches. Rather, he wants to uncover the Arab sociological heritage and 
contribute it to contemporary sociology. This is meant to enhance the latter in 
general, especially when it comes to analyzing and reforming Arab societies, 
to which ancient Arab sociology remains particularly relevant. Second-
ly, ʿUmar ends his list of Arab sociologists with Ibn Khaldun and does not 
address subsequent figures or intellectual developments. ʿUmar’s equation 
of Arab sociologists and their approaches with modern sociology, and the 
posited superiority of the first over the latter, has to be considered an apolo-
getic and ahistorical move that is based on culturalist premises, even though 
ʿUmar also stresses commonalities between Arab and other societies.
3.4 Confronting Hegemonic Sociology: al-Samaluti
Nabil al-Samaluti, Professor emeritus for Sociology at al-Azhar University 
in Cairo has been producing a steady output of works on Islamic Sociology 
and related topics since 1970102 to the present day,103 and has also been 
involved in international debates.104 His works overlap greatly in content 
and several of them are of remarkably poor quality, not only concerning 
academic conventions of referencing, etc., but also as regards technical for-
matting. Thus, for example, instead of a Qurʾanic verse, we in one book 
find a string of emoticons, including skulls and bones and smileys.105 The 
misprinting of a Qurʾanic verse is ever more ironic, since the Qurʾan could 
not be more central to al-Samaluti, who reads it as, among other aspects, 
102 Nabil Muhammad Tawfiq al-Samaluti, al-Manhaj al-Islami fi Dirasat al-Mujtamaʿ: Dira-
sat fi ʿIlm al-Ijtimaʿ al-Islami (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 1970).
103 In 2016 alone, he published the following three works: Nabil al-Samaluti, al-ʿUlum 
al-Ijtimaʿiyya fi Misr bayn al-Taghrib wa-l-Tawtin: ʿIlm al-Ijtimaʿ fi Misr Namudhajan 
(Rabitat al-Jamiʿat al-Islamiyya, 2016); Nabil al-Samaluti, ʿIlm al-Ijtimaʿ fi Misr bayna 
al-Taghrib wa-l-Tawtin: Dirasa fi ʿIlm al-Ijtimaʿ al-Naqdi (Cairo: Dar al-Maʿrifa al-
Jamiʿiyya, 2016); Nabil al-Samaluti, Azmat ʿIlm al-Ijtimaʿ fi al-ʿAlam al-ʿArabi (Dar al-
Maʿrifa al-Jamiʿiyya, 2016).
104 al-Samaluti temporarily served at the Ibn Saʿud University in Riyad (Edipoǧlu, Islamische 
Soziologie, 245n595). He also participated in debates about Islamizing sociology in Ma-
laysia; see Kerim Edipoǧlu, “Islamische Soziologie: Menschen- und Gesellschaftsbild,” 
Zeitschrift für Religionswissenschaft 15, no. 2 (2007): 134n9.
105 al-Samaluti, al-ʿUlum al-Ijtimaʿiyya fi Misr, 8.
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a sociological textbook about modern society. Given the great timespan of 
al-Samaluti’s written output, one may suspect certain shifts over time, and 
a more detailed analysis of his works might be informative in this regard. 
However, his basic position and approach seem to have remained the same. 
To illustrate his conception of Islamic Sociology and, intrinsically related, 
of Islamic society, here I will use his work on The Structure of Islamic Society 
and its Systems: A Study in Islamic Sociology from 1981.106
Al-Samaluti’s work is useful for reflecting upon criteria for participating 
in sociological discourse, since, despite its self-designation as “sociology,” 
it mainly reads like an Islamist program for society. The topic of sociology, 
al-Samaluti sets out, is the scientific study of society through historical, 
statistical, empirical or comparative approaches; all this under the aim of 
conforming with social and historical laws or – and now he equates this 
positivist view of early sociologists with an Islamic one – with the laws 
that God placed in human history and society. The aim of sociology has 
to be to implement these laws for the sake of human felicity. Arab-Muslim 
sociologists ought to critically attend to the different European theoretical 
schools, which are still dominant in Arab universities, and ought to return 
to the Qurʾan to develop a study of society that is based on and directed to-
wards true values. While al-Samaluti is oriented at Western sociology, and 
not only shares a modern view of society as consisting of inter-connected 
sub-systems, but also introduces several technical sociological concepts in 
English, his overt aim is to resurrect an ideal Islamic society, which al-
legedly existed in the early days of Islam and can be reconstructed from 
the Qurʾan.107
Al-Samaluti wants to reach back to the Qurʾan directly and does not 
aim to (re)construct a historical Islamic sociological tradition. It is only 
in his last chapter on an Islamic economy that al-Samaluti refers to earlier 
Muslim thinkers, namely to Ibn Khaldun and to the legal theorists 
al-Mawardi (d. 1058) and Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328), however without dis-
cussing their views at any greater length, let alone contextualizing them. 
He strikingly does not refer to Ibn Khaldun or the philosopher al-Farabi 
(d.  905) at passages that would be most pertinent in this regard.108 
106 al-Samaluti, Binaʾ al-Mujtamaʿ al-Islami wa-Nuzumuhu: Dirasa fi ʿ Ilm al-Ijtimaʿ al-Islami 
(Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 1981).
107 al-Samaluti, 8.
108 For example, al-Samaluti does not refer to Ibn Khaldun’s concept of ʿaṣabiyya when ad-
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Moreover, al-Samaluti does not even seem interested in an actual study 
of historical and social circumstances. Rather, he posits that the Islamic 
shariʿa has stipulated a complete and perfect structure of social systems, 
including the family, economy, politics, administration, legislation, educa-
tion, etc. In contrast to the positivist (read Western) view on these systems, 
the Islamic view considers God as their source.109 For the good of society and 
humanity, the Islamic view has to prevail over the positivist one, al-Samaluti 
exclaims, and begs God to grant Muslims victory over the infidels, that is, to 
have Islamic sociology prevail over positivist sociology.110
3.5 Complementing Hegemonic Sociology: al-Khashshab
Samiya Mustafa al-Khashshab’s proposition of an Islamic Sociology dif-
fers from al-Samaluti’s in both aspects we focus on here, namely the re-
lation to hegemonic sociology and the Islamic sociological resources or 
heritage adduced. In 1980, al-Khashshab argued that the time had come 
for a new branch of sociology to emerge, namely Islamic Sociology.111 At 
the time, al-Khashshab – who is supposedly related to the Egyptian so-
ciologists Mustafa and Ahmad al-Khashshab – taught sociology at Cairo 
University. While she later focused on family sociology,112 the only other 
monograph by her that I am aware of is a book on Sociology of Religion, 
published in 1998.113 Her book on Islamic Sociology was extensively quoted 
and paraphrased, sometimes without appropriate referencing, in 2013 
by Huda al-Shamari, the only other woman to author a book on Islamic 
Sociology.114 Islamic Sociology, according to al-Khashshab, fulfills every 
dressing “group cohesion” (al-Samaluti, Binaʾ al-Mujtamaʿ al-Islami wa-Nuzumuhu, 21) 
or to al-Farabi’s Virtuous City (al-madīna al-fāḍila) when promoting the concept of Vir-
tuous Society (al-mujtamaʿ al-fāḍil) in distinction to Plato’s or Thomas Moore’s utopia 
(al-Samaluti, Binaʾ al-Mujtamaʿ al-Islami wa-Nuzumuhu, 36). The absence of al-Farabi 
might not seem surprising given his standing as a rational philosopher, rather than as 
a religious thinker. However, al-Farabi figured prominently in ʿUmar’s work and even 
more so in al-Khashshab’s, as we shall see. Al-Farabi being absent from al-Samaluti’s work 
thus further characterizes al-Samaluti’s perspective and position.
109 al-Samaluti, Binaʾ al-Mujtamaʿ al-Islami wa-Nuzumuhu, 8.
110 al-Samaluti, 9.
111 Samiya Mustafa al-Khashshab, ʿIlm al-Ijtimaʿ al-Islami (Cairo: Dar al-Maʿarif, 1980), 5.
112 A series of lectures she gave on family sociology can be viewed online; see, for the first 
episode: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IBZwq520W9Q.
113 Samya al-Khashshab, ʿIlm al-Ijtimaʿ al-Dini (Cairo: Dar al-Maʿarif, 1998).
114 Huda al-Shamari, Mabahith fi ʿIlm al-Ijtimaʿ al-Islami: Islamic Sociology (Amman: Dar 
al-Manahij li-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawziʿ, 2011).
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requirement to be considered a proper branch of sociology: it has its specific 
topics (such as social thought in Islam); its own goals (such as highlighting 
the Islamic sociological heritage in the study of social phenomena); and it 
contains different approaches (legal, anthropological, structural, etc.).115
One premise on which al-Khashshab conceives of Islamic Sociology as 
a particular branch of sociology is that Islam is a societal religion. While 
pre-Islamic Arabs did have their share of social thought and organization, 
it was Islam that established a firm social order, al-Khashshab maintains.116 
She considers this social order as part of religion, but clearly operates with 
the modern distinction between different societal spheres when she goes 
on to sketch the political, economic and family structure in Islam.117 More-
over, she posits contemporary values as inherent to these structures, such 
as freedom of expression and belief in the field of politics.118 Al-Khashshab 
also stresses that Islamic Sociology is a descriptive science, not norma-
tive (ʿilm taqrīrī yudarris mā huwa kāʾin wa-lā yataṣadā li-mā yanbaghī 
an yakūn)119. She does not follow up on this claim consistently though. 
For example, she aims at sociologically establishing whether Sufism had 
a positive or negative influence on society.120 Nevertheless, and beyond 
the example of Sufism, al-Khashshab posits Islam not only as the subject, 
but also as the object of society and of sociological inquiry.121 She thereby 
prompts the question, whether the extent to which sociology is conceived 
of as secular or religious, that is at explaining society purely by society or as 
grounding it in revelation, is a consequence of the extent to which society 
is understood as secular or religious.
Concerning the construction of sociological tradition, al-Khashshab 
presents earlier sociological approaches in Islamic thought. To her, the 
Qurʾan is not a resource or even a central reference in this regard. She rather 
extensively adduces and engages Islamic sociological thinkers. In a manner 
not dissimilar to ʿ Umar, she identifies the following approaches: the “socio- 
utopian approach” of al-Farabi (d. 905);122 the “socio-ethical approach” 





120 al-Khashshab, 47, 50.
121 Most explicitly: al-Khashshab, 49–50, 57, 63.
122 al-Khashshab, 70–82.
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of Ibn Miskawayh (d. 1030) and the Ikhwan al-Safa, a largely anonymous 
group of philosophers who lived in the late 10th and 11th centuries;123 and 
the “anthropological approach” pursued by, on the one hand, scholars and 
political advisors that were sent to foreign lands to conduct studies ben-
eficial for the ruler, such as Ahmad ibn Fudlan (10th century),124 and, on 
the other hand, by historians and travelers who independently longed for 
discoveries, such as al-Biruni (d. 1050).125 Finally, al-Khashshab discusses 
at length Ibn Khaldun, who – to her – is the foremost representative of the 
“empirical positivist approach.”126
Moreover, according to al-Khashshab, Ibn Khaldun went far beyond 
the ideas and approaches of the earlier thinkers and ought to be considered 
the true founder of sociology. Al-Khashshab quotes Ibn Khaldun’s distin-
guishing his own approach from that of philosophers like al-Farabi, who 
discussed social association primarily as a utopian ideal. She takes this 
as a call for actual historical and empirical investigation of society.127 In 
general, al-Khashshab reads Ibn Khaldun in a very selective and modern-
izing manner and outrightly equates some of his thoughts with those of 
modern sociology. Among the seven arguments she gives for considering 
Ibn Khaldun the true founder of sociology are the following: Ibn Khaldun 
addressed all the fields of contemporary sociology;128 he conceived of a 
theoretical and an empirical dimension of sociology; he distinguished be-
tween “Microsociology” and “Macrosociology.”129 Moreover, Ibn Khaldun 
also directly influenced modern sociology, al-Khashshab claims, namely 
through his influence on Voltaire, Toynbee and other Europeans.130 This 
claim is however not substantiated historically and thus remains a mere as-
sertion. The purpose of this assertion seems to be the political intent to ap-
propriate sociology as one’s own and the theoretical intent to challenge the 
exclusively European genealogy of sociology. Stressing in the conclusion 
123 al-Khashshab, 82–89.
124 al-Khashshab, 91.
125 al-Khashshab, 91–93. See also: Akbar S Ahmed, “Great Muslim Philosopher Al Beruni 
Was World’s First Anthropologist,” in Caravan Daily, December 22, 2018. http://cara-
vandaily.com/portal/great-muslim-philosopher-al-beruni-was-worlds-first-anthropolo-
gist-akbar-ahmed.






again that Islamic Sociology historically and presently needs to be ac-
knowledged as a branch of sociology, al-Khashshab also sees the revival 
of the Islamic sociological heritage as a means to remedy contemporary 
societal ills.131
4 How (Not) to Take Sociology Beyond the Modern West
4.1 Expanding Sociology Today: Potentials and Limits
Which lessons do the propositions of an Islamic Sociology discussed in the 
previous section yield for the possible expansion of hegemonic sociology 
and its limits?
First of all, Islamic Sociologies clearly share in the modern understand-
ing of society as functionally differentiated. This became especially clear 
in al-Samaluti’s work, even though he overtly confronts a Western secular 
understanding of society. While asserting that the Islamic religion compre-
hensively covers all spheres of social life,132 and has done so since the be-
ginning, al-Samaluti conceives of a “functional interdependence” (he uses 
the English term) of the different systems of society, in the sense of each 
sub-system being connected to others, such as the system of the family 
(niẓām al-usra) being connected with the religious, economic, political and 
legal systems (al-niẓām al-dīnī/al-iqtiṣādī/al-siyāsī/al-qānūnī).133 Accord-
ing to Edipoǧlu, other works aspiring to an Islamic Sociology do not even 
attempt to participate in broader sociological debates. Rather, they only 
accept the body of Islamic law (fiqh) as a basis for reasoning about society 
or rather for normatively prescribing how society ought to be. However, as 
Edipoǧlu rightfully points out, even these works are markedly influenced 
by modern sociological concepts, something which distinguishes them 
from the classical body of Islamic law to which they refer.134 Being part of 
modern society, Islamic Sociologies do not and probably cannot propose 
an understanding of life in common other than as society, but might sub-
stitute Islam for society as the overall principle of social organization.
Islamic Sociologies namely differ from hegemonic sociology, but also 
among each other concerning the normative vision of how society ought 
131 al-Khashshab, 135.
132 Most explicitly: al-Samaluti, Binaʾ al-Mujtamaʿ al-Islami, 17–18.
133 al-Samaluti, 58.
134 Edipoǧlu, “Islamisierung der Soziologie,” 249.
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to be sustained and organized. Such a normative underpinning informs 
every sociological interpretation of society, and Islamic Sociologies help 
to bring out the normativity of hegemonic sociology. They remind us that 
the bases of the sociology envisioned directly result from the society envi-
sioned – in their case, an Islamic society to whose explanation a reference 
to God is indispensable. Hegemonic secular sociology, in turn, assumes 
that God is no explanatory factor in the making of society, and may figure 
in its understanding only insofar as members or institutions of society refer 
to God, conventionally in the sphere of religion (only). It is at this point 
that Islamic Sociology pushes me to explicate my own normativity and to 
actually define criteria for being considered as sociology.
Against both a secularist and religionist bias in the conception of so-
ciology, my argument in this regard would be twofold: first, the ontological 
premise of God existing, of God having created humans as social beings 
or even of God having instituted social laws does not prevent a sociolog-
ical analysis of society, including its religious aspects; second, the criteri-
on to be considered sociology has to remain that God only figures in the 
actual analysis as far as S/He is referenced in society. Moreover, the rep-
resentatives of different varieties of sociology ought to acknowledge that 
their own perspective rests on certain metaphysical assumptions and at 
the same time is particular and was shaped in a contingent process. While 
this demand is based on historical and empirical observations of factual 
plurality, it obviously issues itself from a particular perspective, but one 
that acknowledges its own particularity and takes it as the starting point for 
entering into conversation with other particular perspectives.
In this conversation, both possibilities and limits for expanding and mod-
ifying one’s own perspective will show up, as is illustrated by al-Khashshab 
and al-Samaluti, respectively. From al-Khashshab, I take the insight that a 
secular analysis of society is well possible within a theological framework. 
While she does not spell this lesson out as explicitly herself, al-Khashshab 
posits Islam as both the subject of society and subjected to societal and his-
torical developments. Al-Samaluti, in turn, plainly posits Islam as the subject 
of society and formulates normative demands as to how society ought to be. 
He does not adduce societal or historical circumstances, let alone actually 
analyze them. One may even ask if al-Samaluti, who after all is a professor 
of Sociology (ʿilm al-ijtimāʿ) and in his books directly engages established 
sociologists, is actually part of sociology as understood here.
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The answer hinges on whether one departs from a functional or a 
substantial understanding of sociology. In the latter case, one would ex-
clude al-Samaluti from an understanding of sociology as secular and self- 
reflective in the above sense. This exclusion also again brings out one’s own 
normativity. Functional definitions in general tend to allow for a broader 
inclusion of positions. This is also the case here. The basic social function 
of sociology is to provide answers as to how society is to be understood 
and organized, and this under the modern conditions of contingency, in 
which the need to reflect upon life in common and its order has become 
permanent. Sociology is successful if it is able to provide theoretically 
informed answers to the social questions identified in society. Different 
strands of sociology will cater for different social milieus, even within one 
society. Al-Samaluti’s elaboration of an Islamic Sociology might fulfill this 
function by catering for a milieu that wants to subsume modern society 
under a comprehensive Islamic viewpoint. Al-Samaluti’s lack of attention 
for concrete societal circumstances or problems can be partially explained 
by him questioning the very basis of social life and order. After all, it is 
in rather stable and more or less well-functioning societies that sociology 
is attending to more concrete societal questions and problems. Neverthe-
less, if al-Samaluti is considered part of sociology, his sociology is of poor 
quality, due to the lack of theoretical and methodological reflection and the 
absence of producing insights about actual social formations.
In fact, when it comes to the actual production of scientific knowledge, 
Islamic Sociologies in general hardly produce any alternative theories or 
methods. Moreover, their critical calls for a more value-based and value- 
oriented science can also be voiced from within secular sociology itself. 
Katharina Lange has shown this concerning propositions of an Islamic An-
thropology.135 Precisely because there is ultimately only one sociology as a 
particular mode of interpretation across modern societies, this sociology 
should aim to integrate the different conditions, experiences and resources 
of these societies.
On a practical level, the creation of a more inclusive sociology, con-
structed from a greater variety of perspectives, hinges on globally improving 
economic, educational and political conditions for producing sociologi-
cal knowledge. This is not trivial, for it is to say that to aim for a more 
135 Lange, Zurückholen, was uns gehört, 82.
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inclusive sociology – from a self-critical hegemonic perspective – does 
not mean to endorse calls for alternative sociologies from the margins, 
but rather to support initiatives that aim at improving local socio-political, 
economic and educational conditions for participating in global sociologi- 
cal discourse.
4.2 Sociology before ‘Sociology’?
The aim of constructing a more inclusive sociology for connected modern 
societies entails the aim of also establishing more connected, non- 
Eurocentric genealogies of sociology. This aim, on the one hand, necessi-
tates interrogating critically the narrative that sociology evolved within a 
self-sufficient European tradition, as Bhambra and others have done. On 
the other hand, it means probing into alternative genealogies of sociology 
and bringing other sociological traditions into view. The attempt to iden-
tify sociology before its academic institutionalization means questioning 
the view that sociology was a completely novel and exclusively European 
mode of looking at and interpreting the world. This is an instance of the 
wider critique of the view that modernity was a complete rupture, which in 
the case of non-European countries was moreover induced externally. This 
view in general is mistaken and in the case of sociology, we have seen that 
in Arab countries sociology was instituted under the sign of colonial he-
gemony, but in acts of creative synthesis of different intellectual resources; 
for example, reading Durkheim together with Ibn Khaldun. However, it 
is a crucial difference whether one maintains, as one may well do, that 
thoughts of Ibn Khaldun can be put to fruitful sociological use or wheth-
er one posits Ibn Khaldun to have produced works of sociology, to have 
been a proto-sociologist or to have even founded sociology. It is a crucial 
difference whether one aims to construct a genealogy of sociology from 
within contemporary sociology or whether one claims to reconstruct the 
history of sociology. In this regard, the central lesson from the above- 
discussed propositions of Arab and Islamic Sociologies is the primacy of 
the present in constructions of the past. To acknowledge this primacy of the 
present might sound trivial in the first place, but yields several hermeneutical 
consequences for the interplay of present and past categories.
Whereas most propositions of an Islamic Sociology, like al-Samaluti’s, 
project sociology directly back onto the Qurʾan, some works, like al-
Khashshab’s, adduce a pre-colonial, historical Islamic tradition of socio-
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logical thought. Moreover, they assert that this tradition contributed to or 
even shaped modern European sociology. This assertion was, however, not 
supported anywhere with actual historical findings. Others, like ʿUmar, ar-
gue for a continuity of sociological thought based on culturalist postulates 
of essentially unchanging features of Arab collective life. Such challenges 
to the claim that modern society and its interpreting science of sociology 
mark a full rupture, thus remain unsubstantiated historically. Rather, these 
constructions of alternative sociological heritages in the end affirm con-
temporary, hegemonically shaped sociology, in view and in hindsight of 
whose establishment they occur. Put otherwise, histories of ‘sociology’ will 
always be histories of the hegemonically shaped present – for which ‘the 
West’ is a cipher – since the hegemonic elaboration of sociology remains 
the starting point for constructing alternative sociological traditions.
Then again, this does not at all mean that from this starting point one 
can only affirm, but never modify, existing hegemony. For once, ‘the West’ 
– again: as a cipher for hegemony – is a rather elusive and increasingly plu-
ral construction. Moreover, to make hegemonically shaped concepts travel 
– whether ‘sociology,’ ‘secularity,’ ‘religion’ or, indeed, ‘the West’ itself – is 
a double move: on the one hand, it subsumes other contexts under pres-
ent hegemony; but on the other hand, it undermines claims to hegemonic 
exclusivity by fueling non-hegemonic varieties into present concepts. In 
this sense, constructions of an Arab or Islamic sociological heritage are not 
merely ahistorical, apologetic endeavors, but show that a presently shared 
mode of sociological thought can be justified and critiqued from within 
various constructed traditions, of which the European tradition is but one. 
Put more generally, our common present can be sustained via different 
constructed traditions.
That being said, to identify sociological aspects before the institutiona- 
lization of sociology seems, at least as of now, possible only in a compara-
tive sense and not as an outgrown genealogy, let alone a history. Trying to 
write a history of sociological thought would be naive in that it would proj-
ect sociology back to an asserted point of origin. Genealogically, one may 
of course trace back the immediate pre-history of institutional sociology 
in individual countries.136 At least in the Arab-Islamic context, the traces 
would disappear rather early back in time though. This is partially due to 
136 See section 3.1 for hints in that direction concerning Egypt.
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the lasting effects of the now outdated paradigm of intellectual decline in 
the Islamic world prior to the onset of colonial modernity. It is, however, 
also due to sociology being a particular mode of looking at the world that 
is bound to the epistemic and political conditions of modernity. While this 
suggests that one should speak of ‘sociology’ only in regard to its modern 
formation, it still allows for identifying individual aspects of sociological 
thought or, as functional equivalents, earlier modes of reasoning about life 
in common. Since this primarily comparative enterprise is inquiring into 
both ruptures and continuities in the formation of sociology, it further in-
forms about the modern specificities of sociology, but might also facilitate 
more connected genealogies of sociology in the end.
Substantial aspects of sociological reasoning will never amount to so-
ciology in the modern sense, but always only represent partial aspects of 
‘sociology.’ To posit Ibn Khaldun as the founder of sociology is an ahistori- 
cal assertion and to characterize him as a proto-sociologist falls into the 
teleological trap. To extract individual aspects of Ibn Khaldun’s thinking 
for the purpose of present sociological reasoning and to on this basis con-
sider Ibn Khaldun to have been a sociologist both ignores the epistemic 
foundations of sociology and does not appreciate the thinking of Ibn Khal-
dun within its own epistemic and historical context.137 That being said, it is 
of course not for no reason that sociologists have been appropriating Ibn 
Khaldun so widely. Thus, his famous concept of ʿaṣabiyya shows that also 
before sociology humans theorized the integration of human collectivities. 
Contextualized within its metaphysical assumptions, however, ʿaṣabiyya 
recalls the particularly modern claim of sociologists to order social for-
mations according to their human insights, too. Or take al-Farabi’s dif-
ferentiation of different types of association (ijtimāʿ) and his formulating 
the principles of a well-ordered human collectivity that is able to attain 
felicity. To ask and answer these questions is clearly not particular to so-
ciology. However, one cannot actually understand al-Farabi’s reflections on 
collective life outside his cosmological, metaphysical and epistemological 
  
137 Recent works situating Ibn Khaldun within his own times are: Allen James Fromherz, Ibn 
Khaldun, Life and Times (Edinburgh University Press, 2011); Robert Irwin, Ibn Khaldun: 
An Intellectual Biography (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018); see also Aziz al-
Azmeh, Ibn Khaldūn. An Essay in Reinterpretation (Budapest: Central European University 
Press, 2003 [1982]).
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assumptions,138 which – through their contrast with sociology’s assump-
tions of independent human reason and agency – make the latter’s speci-
ficity ever more obvious. It is thus rather through contrasts that the present 
may learn something from al-Farabi’s utopia.139 The bottom line of this is 
that those earlier sociological aspects identified with hindsight of sociolo-
gy were a far cry from having constituted sociology in themselves and can 
even only be characterized as ‘sociological’ if one leaves aside that the fun-
damental epistemic and political underpinnings of ‘sociology’ are present 
in the semantics of ‘sociological.’
This suggests considering both sociology and sociological reasoning 
as particular responses to more widely shared questions and consequently 
searching for functional equivalents to sociology. The basic function 
of sociology, we have said, is to provide answers as to how society is to 
be understood and organized, and this under the modern conditions of 
permanent contingency and the assumption of an “immanent frame.”140 
Under this definition of the reference problem that prompts sociological 
thought, al-Samaluti also formed part of sociology, even though he has 
an open spin on the immanent frame, rather than a closed one as most 
secular sociologists do. When asking for functional equivalents to socio- 
logy outside the modern political and epistemic conditions, the reference 
problem obviously has to be defined more broadly. A very basic suggestion 
in this regard would be the problem of how life in common (not: ‘society’) 
is to be understood and organized. In pre-modern times, this was largely 
under the condition of only temporary contingency and the assumption 
of a transcendent frame – whether mediated by reason or prophecy. Re-
curring reference problems prompting reflections about life in common 
seem to have been moments of instability and crisis. This is very obvious 
 
138 Pertinently, if briefly: Geert Hendrich, Arabisch-islamische Philosophie: Geschichte und 
Gegenwart (Frankfurt a. M.: Campus, 2005), 64.
139 In this sense, a reading of al-Farabi such as the following can be inspiring, precisely be-
cause it issues from contemporary concerns, rather than situating al-Farabi in his own 
times: Alexander Orwin, Redefining the Muslim Community: Ethnicity, Religion, and Poli-
tics in the Thought of Alfarabi (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017). 
140 For Charles Taylor’s metaphor of the “immanent frame” in the context of Islamic moderni-
ty, see: Florian Zemmin, “A Secular Age and Islamic Modernism,” in Working with A Secular 
Age. Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Charles Taylor’s Master Narrative, ed. Florian Zemmin, 
Colin Jager, and Guido Vanheeswijck (Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2016), 309–10.
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in Ibn Khaldun,141 but was implicitly also in the background of al-Farabi’s 
utopian formulation of an ideal human collectivity.142 Another impetus to 
theorize about life in common more generally were comparisons between 
different human collectivities, as is again most evident in Ibn Khaldun.143 
Thus, one may assume that moments of theorizing life in common did not 
continuously evolve or even accumulate over time, but rather emerged and 
receded, before sociological reasoning became a permanent requirement 
of modern society.144 While it is again only with the hindsight of sociology 
that such earlier moments of theorizing are being identified as ‘sociologi- 
cal,’ they served as functional equivalents to sociology concerning com-
monly shared reference problems.
The above arguments sustain a more general, threefold argument that 
I would also want to submit concerning the case of secularity, namely: it 
is under the primacy of the present that histories are being constructed, 
whence they are hermeneutically always genealogies; it is from within the 
present that earlier instances of presently central categories are being iden-
tified, but these are at best only partial instantiations of present categories; 
it is as functional equivalents that earlier instances can best be viewed on a 
par with present ones, even though that function has to be conceived of in 
a rather basic sense so as to be applicable to different epistemic conditions.
141 See, for example: Fromherz, Ibn Khaldun, 123; Alatas, Applying Ibn Khaldūn, 154; Alatas, 
“Ibn Khaldūn,” 12–13.
142 See, for example: al-Khashshab, ʿIlm al-Ijtimaʿ al-Islami, 71, 81; Orwin, Redefining the 
Muslim Community, 160–61; Hendrich, Arabisch-islamische Philosophie, 71.
143 For example: Fromherz, Ibn Khaldun, 119; see also: Friedrich H. Tenbruck, “Was war der 
Kulturvergleich, ehe es den Kulturvergleich gab?,” in Soziale Welt, Sonderband 8: Zwi-
schen den Kulturen, ed. Joachim Matthes (Göttingen: Otto Schwartz & Co., 1992).
144 Bhargava interestingly assumes conceptual spaces to open up and close again at different 
historical moments: Rajeev Bhargava, “Forms of Secularity before Secularism,” in Worlds 
of Difference, ed. Saïd Amir Arjomand and Elisa Reis (London: Sage, 2013), 95–96.
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5 Conclusion: Secularity Beyond the Modern West
It is, in fact, impossible to predict based on religious affiliation which posi-
tion a Muslim might take in regard to human rights.145
[F]or my part, I sincerely believe that no one owns the notion of human 
rights. You know, when you support human rights, a certain nationalism 
comes forward: for an American human rights are the invention of Jeffer-
son, for a Frenchman it is 1789, for an Englishman something else. Well, in 
these circumstances, I can also cite [the second caliph] Omar ibn al-Khat-
tab, who said ‘How can you enslave people when their mothers brought 
them into the world free?’. So, if each human community is going to search 
in its own history for an origin to human rights, it will always come up with 
something.146
In our widely connected present, different historical references are used 
in order to provide answers to shared questions. These answers differ not 
least due to differences in social and economic status, political convic-
tions and biographical background, in short: based on one’s standing in 
and experience of the world. On this basis, religious affiliations or cultural 
resources at one’s disposal primarily provide particular modes for elabo-
rating individual answers. This might sound counter-intuitive given that 
religion and culture are ubiquitously adduced not as modes, but as causes of 
different positions. That is understandable insofar as particular traditions 
are more visible than common epistemic conditions. Moreover, it is easier 
to embrace and identify with particular narratives than entangled geneal-
ogies. As of now, there seems to be a need to legitimize or critique widely 
shared contemporary conditions or convictions through particular modes 
of legitimization. Mohamed Charfi has identified this need and possibility 
in the above quote, and from Mahmoud Bassiouni, who in the most so-
phisticated and convincing manner elaborated an Islamic legitimization 
for the universal value of human rights, we can take the insight that this 
very legitimization is not determined by the Islamic tradition, but stems 
from a reading of that tradition in light of more widely shared demands 
and convictions in the present. Bassiouni moreover definitely brings to 
145 Mahmoud Bassiouni, Menschenrechte zwischen Universalität und islamischer Legitimität 
(Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2014), 77, transl. FZ.
146 Mohamed Charfi quoted in Kevin Dwyer, Arab Voices (London/New York: Routledge, 
1991), 175.
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naught claims that human rights exclusively stem from and can only truly 
be sustained within one particular tradition. The primacy of the common 
present in regard to human rights is at least as clear as it was concerning 
the different constructions of sociological heritages. What about secularity, 
then? Is secularity, despite resounding claims of being tied to one particu- 
lar tradition, also a commonly shared condition that can be legitimized 
and critiqued from within different discursive traditions?
To address that question, I think it is useful not to equate ‘secularity’ 
with the hegemonic distinction between religion and the secular, but to 
consider ‘secularity’ as one particular variety of conceptualizing and legiti- 
mizing the distinction between religion and the secular or rather, to put it 
more broadly and thus more productively for our purposes, between reli-
gion and society. In regard to Islamic contexts, we briefly note, first of all, 
that structural differentiations between religion and other societal spheres 
are in place in modern Islamic, as in other modern societies.147 But also 
on the level of conceptual distinctions, modern and contemporary Islamic 
actors, too, operate with the distinction between religion and society.148 
This holds true also for those actors who overtly reject the notion of ‘secu- 
larity,’ as we have seen in the case of al-Samaluti. After all, on the basis of 
distinction one can argue either for separation or connection. It is true, the 
overt rejection not only of ‘secularism’ but also of  ‘secularity’ still has wider 
purchase among Islamic actors, and this is despite the increasing usage of 
concepts such as ‘secular Muslim’ and ‘Islamic secularism’. Wohlrab-Sahr 
and Burchardt rightly stress that “the rejection of concepts such as secular-
isation or secularism in large parts of the Islamic world is not necessarily 
bound up with the absence of differentiations between the religious and 
the secular.”149 They further assume, and plausibly so, that this rejection is 
due to the absence of “readily accessible guiding ideas of secularity with 
which such distinctions could be legitimised.”150 If, however, we shift the 
perspective and consider ‘secularity’ itself a particular guiding idea to dis-
tinguish between religion and society, alternative guiding ideas to concep-
tualize this very distinction come into view.
147 See, for example, in spite of its title: Gudrun Krämer, “Modern but not Secular: Religion, 
Identity and the ordre public in the Arab Middle East,” International Sociology 28, no. 6 
(2013): 630.
148 Zemmin, Modernity in Islamic Tradition, 164–76.
149 Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt, “Revisiting the Secular,” 14.
150 Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt, 14.
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These alternatives can least problematically be related to ‘secularity’ 
when they are directly engaging ‘secularity’ or are clearly operating with the 
distinction between a religious and a secular sphere. Guiding ideas to con-
ceptualize this distinction from within the Islamic tradition include the dis-
tinctions between ʿibādāt and muʿāmalāt or between dīn and dunyā. These 
distinctions are notably formulated within Islam. If in general it was from a 
religious perspective that society first appeared as secular, then Islam also 
can be used to address both religion and the secular.151 On this basis, one can 
Islamically argue for either connections or disconnections between religion 
and society. But also in the latter case, the Islamic mode of the argument 
tends to blur the factual distinction between religion and the secular, a dis-
tinction that is hegemonically conceptualized as ‘secularity.’ Due to the ob-
vious relation and oftentimes direct interaction of hegemonic secularity and 
other modes of distinction in colonial modernity, ‘secularity’ is the evident 
starting point for discerning such alternative modes within modernity.
To trace the formation of these alternative distinctions between religion 
and society back in time ought however not to depart from ‘secularity,’ but 
rather from the alternative conceptualizations of this distinction themselves. 
This means taking the actual terms conceptualizing this distinction as the 
guiding units of inquiry, and this as historical concepts, not analytical ones. 
To trace the historicity of these concepts and their changing semantics is 
primarily a genealogical enterprise, which interrogates the formation of the 
present or of modernity. It can, however, be complemented with conceptual 
histories that trace the evolution of the historical terms under interrogation 
forward in time. After all, conceptual history can well be conceived of as a 
genealogy of the present. More importantly, taking the historical terms that 
came to conceptualize the distinction between religion and (secular) society 
as one’s guiding units, ensures that the connection to that modern distinc-
tion, and hence to ‘secularity,’ is constantly retained.
This implies, in turn, that one might not bring into view other 
possible  distinctions not directly connected to one’s starting point of ‘secu- 
larity.’  This significant restriction follows from the interest in how the pres- 
ent evolved, rather than in trying to uncover what has been lost. Other 
pre-modern distinctions – as in the Islamicate case, the distinction 
151 Reinhard Schulze, “On Relating Religion to Society and Society to Religion,” in Debating 
Islam. Negotiating Religion, Europe, and the Self, ed. Samuel M. Behloul, Susanne Leuen-
berger, and Andreas Tunger-Zanetti (Bielefeld: transcript, 2013), esp. 336, 346–47.
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between adab and sharīʿa152 – might be most significant historically, but to 
directly equate them with ‘secularity’ would mean to subsume them under 
this present category.153 One can, of course, avoid this pitfall by saying that 
one merely understands them as ‘secularity,’ but this gives up on the aim of 
actually bringing other understandings into view. In general, for identify-
ing aspects of the secular before ‘secularity,’ the same restrictions apply as 
for identifying sociological aspects before ‘sociology.’
Also analogous to the above considerations concerning ‘sociology,’ 
one might however identify functional equivalents to ‘secularity,’ that is, 
to the distinction between religion and society. This amounts to connect-
ing earlier distinctions to ‘secularity’ on theoretical grounds, rather than 
on grounds of historical connections. In this regard, Wohlrab-Sahr and 
Burchardt’s configuration of reference problems154 was indeed a most con-
vincing and fruitful move. The next step, it seems to me, would be to iden-
tify reference problems that are less particular to modern societies, but also 
applicable to earlier formations of collective life. The aspired connection to 
‘secularity’ still seems most firmly ensured, when sticking to those histori- 
cal terms that came to conceptualize the distinction between religion and 
(secular) society. Either way, tracing back the modern distinction between 
religion and the secular will inevitably reach a point at which it no longer 
makes sense, but dissolves into something else.
Not to suggest that this something else was some undifferentiated 
wholesomeness, but also not to conflate it with ‘secularity,’ requires a model 
of distinctions before secularity. Reinhard Schulze has fruitfully suggested 
such a model that accounts for the evolution of distinctions in Islamic 
contexts and beyond.155 According to this model, the first distinction one 
can grasp is the one between sacred and profane, that is, between objects 
with and without meaning. Those sacred objects are then differentiated 
into transcendent and immanent ones, that is, into those whose meaning is 
induced externally and others which hold their meaning within them. In a 
third distinction, the transcendent is then differentiated into the religious 
152 Armando Salvatore, “The Islamicate Adab Tradition vs. the Islamic Shari‘a, from Pre- 
colonial to Colonial,” in Working Paper Series of the HCAS “Multiple Secularities – Beyond 
the West, Beyond Modernities” 3 (Leipzig University, 2018).
153 See: Armando Salvatore, “The Islamicate Adab Tradition,” 15; Armando Salvatore, The 
Sociology of Islam: Knowledge, Power and Civility (Chichester: Wiley Blackwell, 2016), 263.
154 Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt, “Revisiting the Secular,” 20–24.
155 Schulze, Der Koran und die Genealogie des Islam, 109–47.
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and the secular.156 This last distinction follows upon the insight of humans 
that it has been they who inflicted meaning on objects or did not do so. 
To be religious is thus to continuously affirm that objects in the world, 
including humans, gain meaning through reference to something beyond. 
To be secular, in turn, means to, as a human being, attribute the meaning 
of worldly objects, including humans, to themselves. One may wonder if 
we – keeping in mind that earlier distinctions remain as semantic layers 
to which we can resort – are currently living through a fourth distinction, 
which might work towards bounding meaning within individual human 
beings alone.
Be that as it may, the importance of this model for tracing back secular-
ity lies in the fact that it helps to not depict earlier distinctions as expres-
sions of the modern distinction between religion and the secular. Thus, 
for example, al-Farabi clearly distinguished between prophetic and rational 
knowledge. However, following the above model, this was no distinction 
between religion and the secular. Rather both types of knowledge media- 
ted the same transcendental truth.157 The most basic reference problem 
bringing together as a tertium comparationis secularity and earlier distinc-
tions might be the need of humans to make sense of, give meaning to and 
order the world. This basic problem is obviously too vague to be useable 
in research on varieties of secularity. However, this very vagueness again 
underlines that secularity itself cannot be readily transposed onto earlier 
epistemic conditions. Moreover, from this most basic tertium, more par-
ticular ones evolve, such as the distinction between actors responsible for 
maintaining spheres of meaning.
Finally, it ought to be clear – and there is no escaping this – that the 
above suggestions are again formulated from one particular perspective in 
the present. The hegemonic coinage of ‘secularity’ is obviously still present 
in the above argument that ‘secularity’ is but one variety of conceptualiz-
ing the more widely operative distinction between religion and the secular. 
More fundamentally still, the aim of including earlier distinctions either 
as functional equivalents to secularity or on grounds of a historical model 
156 See also: Reinhard Schulze, “Die Dritte Unterscheidung: Islam, Religion und Säkulari-
tät,” in Religionen – Wahrheitsansprüche – Konflikte. Theologische Perspektiven, ed. Walter 
Dietrich and Wolfgang Lienemann (Zürich: TVZ, 2010).
157 Pertinently: Ulrich Rudolph, Islamische Philosophie: Von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart 
(München: Beck, 2004), 32–33.
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does not result in a distanced view of these different distinctions, of which 
one is currently operational. After all, it is from within the current moment 
that one theorizes other possible moments. The first thing a social theory 
that aspires to integrate non-modern orderings of the world has to do, is to 
view the modern approach to the world as a particular one next to others, 
as Gesa Lindemann argues.158 However, ultimately, one has to acknowledge 
with Lindemann that the general force of order that underlies the different 
particular orderings of the world and makes it possible to relate them to 
each other cannot be defined by necessity.159
158 Gesa Lindemann, Weltzugänge: Die mehrdimensionale Ordnung des Sozialen (Weilers-
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